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S&D recruits more international contributors and opens its aperture to welcome articles 
on the political economy of space.  
 
 
This issue of the journal begins our 
editorial push to feature more peer-reviewed 
contributions from international authors.  Last 
summer, I had the opportunity to attend the ISA-
FLACSO joint meeting in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  The exchange brought together 
members of the largest international studies 
association in the United States with social 
sciences faculty from prestigious universities in 
Latin America.  Not only did this journal receive 
two papers from the meeting (on cyber war from 
Brazil and on developing launcher programs from 
Argentina), it also became clear that implications 
of the “3 C’s” for space—the domain becoming 
more congested, competitive, and contested—
reach well beyond arms control and traditional 
international security of the great powers. 
 
Rapidly growing political consensus that 
American leadership in the world faces enormous 
challenges after large-scale military 
disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan along 
with ongoing fiscal crises at home is bound to 
push national security and questions of political 
economy, after a long hiatus, back together.  A 
recent chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
identified spiraling national debt as the most 
dangerous threat to the United States, and his 
successor, General Martin Dempsey, last year 
articulated the most pressing challenge for the 
military as adapting operations, “the bend of 
power,” in order to make do with less—i.e., fewer 
personnel and scarcer dollars for technology 
modernization—while doing just as well.   
 
Of course, one of the few ways to do more with 
less, if this is even possible at the grand strategic 
level, is to pull from some other shelf, or draw 
from another resource that has fallen into disuse.  
The wherewithal to bend steel, to reorganize a 
restricted defense budget in order to produce a 
more effective military under changing 
international conditions, has to come from 
somewhere, and a natural field to explore, given 
previous interaction with International Security, is 
Political Economy. 
 
As U.S. military presence and actions in the world 
subside how do international flows in trade, 
investment, and information bear upon national 
development policies?  Where are the points of 
contact within transnational, regional, national, or 
subnational institutions at which smart, low-
intensity or nonviolent military intervention could 
make a difference?  During the Cold War, 
political economy was addressed, problematically, 
by cultivating militarized methods for eliminating 
recalcitrant factions or toppling rogue regimes in 
the Third World.  One difference between then 
and now is the United States does not face 
implacable ideological adversaries backed by 
economic and military resources of a superpower 
patron, so there may be more room for 
cooperation with incumbent governments, the sort 
of relationship that could lead to mutual learning 
on critical security issues rather than naked 
subordination to priorities of American national 
defense. 
 
According to the most recent Quadrennial 
Defense Review (2014), and with the same 
sentiment permeating the 2015 National Security 
Strategy and national space policy documents, the 
United States needs new and renewed partnerships, 
now.  Presumably, the ailing unipole needs them 
more than it did during troubled times of the late 
Cold War when Kenneth Waltz wrote about 
stability of bipolarity and superpower status 
against allied defections or flirtations like, in those 
days, West German Ostpolitik.  At the same time, 
potential interlocutors, today, have less need for 
the United States. 
 
In the wake of the ISA-FLACSO conference, 
Brazilian diplomacy, including relevant aspects of 
space policy, is a case in point.  On major 
international questions—Western agricultural 
subsidies haunting the Doha Round of world trade 
talks; nuclear sanctions on Iran; lease agreements 
with foreign tech giants to exploit massive 
petroleum reserves in the pre-sál layer off the 
coast of São Paulo; sanctioning Russia for 
military aggression against Ukraine; or supporting 
Israeli reprisals against Hamas militants in Gaza, 
Brazil’s voice has cut across U.S. policy, making 
it harder for the United States to attain strategic 
goals.  Added to the crowded field calling 
America’s global leadership into question, 
Brazil’s demonstrated independence complicates 
scholars’ notions—scholars ranging from John 
Mearsheimer to Barry Buzan—of U.S. regional 
hegemony.  Brazil, it turns out, is relatively free to 
drive a hard bargain, to partner with the United 
States or compete against “the last remaining 
superpower,” as Brazil’s interests demand. 
 
The same sort of mixed-motive game is playing 
out in space.  Space policy both reflects the global 
dynamic of a struggling hegemon and helps shape 
it.  While the United States holds a technological 
lead, Brazil is eager to cooperate, and there has 
been significant cooperation from the training of a 
Brazilian astronaut to design of satellite platforms 
for oceanographic observation.  Yet, the Brazilian 
pioneer in question ended up flying to low-earth 
orbit on a Russian ship, and with respect to a 
parallel attempt to develop indigenous launch 
capability, Brazil forged agreements with U.S. 
competitors such as China and Ukraine. 
  
The advent of competitive and congested space 
places U.S. defense institutions in a dilemma 
unlike those they faced for much of the Cold War.  
They must continue to guard a precious 
technological advantage from potential rivals, but 
now they are obliged to huckster as well.  
Increasingly, many would-be partners have 
attractive alternative options.  One technical 
manager in Latin America described a trend for 
space operations that captures a conundrum for 
the United States, generally.  Emerging space 
nations want to work with the United States 
because of the financial capital and state-of-the-art 
technology the incumbent leader in space brings 
to the table, but when it comes to institutional 
cooperation, the United States decides which 
technologies are dual-use.  In order to prevent 
diffusion and erosion of its military advantage in 
space technology, the United States imposes 
restrictions on personnel and parts that are 
permitted in joint projects, causing unexpected 
delays and extra production costs. 
 
Junior partners tolerate these while U.S. 
equipment and know-how reigns supreme, but the 
technology gap with other suppliers such as 
Europe, China, Russia, and Brazil is closing.  If 
Brazil, for example, can fulfill a simpler and more 
efficient cooperation agreement to assist a smaller 
economy with modern earth observation satellites, 
Brazilian companies may capture business, 
developing with junior partners their own market 
niche that excludes the United States.  If the 
United States does not share more, its lead will 
deteriorate in commercial space technology; yet, 
if it does sweeten offers of cooperation with new 
partners by lowering restrictions, its military 
advantage could disappear.     
 
The United States cannot resolve its grand 
strategic dilemma by declaring simply that it will 
play the benign hegemon, providing global goods, 
including space knowledge and services for 
national development, at the same time it retards 
other states by starving them of dual-use 
technology.  The window for a strategy of 
uncompromising space dominance is closing 
along with America’s technological margin.  In 
order to extend its influence, and thereby secure 
its defense, the United States will have to share 
more and exclude less to retain the best 
international partners.  Finding the right balance 
between enlightened service to the global system 
and classic controls for national security will 
demand tailored negotiations, based upon 
extensive knowledge of comparative political 
economy.  This is “actor-specific” knowledge that 
Alexander George famously touted in Bridging 
the Gap (1993), and it reflects an antecedent 
intellectual movement when International Political 
Economy merged with comparative politics to 
better identify favorable conditions, applicable to 
various states in different regions of the world, for 
development and successful integration into the 
global system. 
 
Observing the discussion at ISA-FLACSO and 
speaking with experts on the sidelines of the 
meeting, it was clear that foreign policy in Latin 
America remains attuned to ideas percolating at 
the intersection of International Security, IPE, and 
 
 
Comparative Politics.  The theme of the meeting 
was “Global and Regional Powers in a Changing 
World,” and several speakers anticipated historic 
shifts in the international distribution of power not 
from class warfare or revolution in leading states 
but from diffusion of technology and asymmetric 
gains in labor productivity for rising powers. 
 
A changing of the guard for international political 
economy was thought to create a raft of new 
opportunities for midsize economies like 
Argentina’s and those even smaller.  Information-
age industries did not require huge military 
complexes or enormous capital reserves but smart 
investments by governments in education and 
communications in order to attract foreign capital 
and boost the private sector.  Excitement over 
emerging technologies and historic shifts on the 
horizon for global order moved discourse to the 
right.  There was less talk about resisting 
hegemonic exploitation and more on how to 
prepare states in the wings of global competition 
to thrive during the fresh economic and political 
challenges to come, encompassing planetary not 
just national defense. 
 
In contrast to the buzz surrounding high 
technology, there was surprisingly little talk about 
roles civil or commercial space might play in 
upcoming global and regional power shifts.  This 
silence belied the growth in long-distance 
telecommunications and demand for terrestrial 
information derived from space imagery.  It also 
introduced the United States, seeking to 
strengthen national defense through new 
partnerships and deepening cooperation, to a new 
variant of a familiar strategic puzzle.  The solution 
on how to approach developing space nations, 
even as the domain becomes more “congested, 
competitive, and contested,” will require actor-
specific information as well as grand strategic 
thinking.   
 
Argentina and Brazil, for example, relative to the 
United States occupy roughly similar structural 
positions in the international political economy of 
space activity.  Brazil may spend five to ten times 
more money than Argentina on space, but both 
Latin American powers spend less than one 
percent of the U.S. budget.  Nevertheless, in spite 
of their similar positions and parallel ambitions to 
build a complete national program—adding 
launch and design to satellite operation capacity—
Brazil and Argentina manage their national efforts 
with respect to civil-military relations very 
differently.  Lacking actor-specific information 
contextualized within a broad strategic framework, 
the United States risks unnecessary blunders, 
aggravating political sensitivities and ruining 
investments, as it competes with Russia and China 
to win the business and forge cooperative 
networks with emerging space actors. 
 
This journal, Space & Defense, and its host, the 
Eisenhower Center at the United States Air Force 
Academy, can contribute to policy by promoting 
and disseminating systematic research, both 
theoretical and empirical, on the new political 
economy of space services.  Decision makers 
might then draw upon the best possible expert 
knowledge when negotiating—with a diverse 
range of partners—accords at once mutually 
beneficial and consistent with United States 
defense strategy in a changing world.  As a 
uniquely powerful state within the global system, 
the United States, while continuing to counter 
adversaries and reassure allies, supports a 
progressive international order that reflects its 
own Constitutional principles, facilitates 
productive compromises, and, frankly, reduces the 
costs of wielding influence.  In the daily rush of 
events, national security and foreign policy 
bureaucracies are hard-pressed to study either 
general principles or critical idiosyncrasies of 
emerging space powers.  Whenever ethical policy 
making and social science method combine, 
Space & Defense would like to nurture practical 
knowledge of political economy at the nexus of 
government, industry, and academia.       
 
     
    Damon Coletta 
    USAFA 





Strategic Nuclear Weapons for Planetary Defense 
 
James Howe 
A Global-Zero world, one without nuclear weapons, might leave the planet more vulnerable.  
 
The planet Earth is continually under 
bombardment.
1
  Each day, roughly 100 tons of 
small meteoroids and space debris – some as large 
as a meter in diameter, but most smaller than a 
grain of sand – strike the atmosphere.
2
  Moving at 
speeds in excess of 40,000 kilometers per hour, 
these meteoroids are often seen as bright streaks 
in the sky as they burn up from atmospheric 
friction.
3
  Fortunately, because they are consumed 
high in the atmosphere, meteoroids and space dust 
pose no threat to humans or other life on Earth. 
 
Unfortunately, there are larger objects in orbit 
around the Sun that can pose a significant threat to 
the planet.  It is estimated that as many as a billion 
asteroids and possibly two trillion comets inhabit 
the solar system.
4
  Asteroids range in size from a 
meter to hundreds of kilometers in diameter: the 
solid nuclei of comets can be several kilometers 
wide.  For both asteroids and comets, the larger 
their size, the less frequently they appear in nature.  
While the vast majority of asteroids orbit between 
Mars and Jupiter, a very small percentage of them 
are on elliptical paths that cross Earth’s orbital 
track, along with a much smaller number of 
comets.  Of these, some invariably collide with 
                                                          
1
 James Howe served for twenty-seven years on active 
duty in the U.S. Coast Guard and has earned master's 
degrees from the U.S. Marine Corps War College, 
Harvard University (Extension School), and the 
American Military University. 
2
 National Research Council, Defending Planet Earth: 
Near-Earth-Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation 
Strategies (Washington, D.C.: the National Academies 
Press, 2010), 12. 
3
 John S. Lewis, Rain of Fire and Ice: The Very Real 
Threat of Comet and Asteroid Bombardment 
(Lexington, KY: Perseus Publishing, 1996), 37. 
4
 David J. Eicher, Comets! Visitors from Deep Space 




On average, an asteroid between 30-50 meters in 
size strikes Earth every 100-200 years.
6
 Such 
asteroids are capable of inflicting damage over a 
wide area and have the potential for killing 
thousands of people.  Much larger asteroids, 
although exceptionally rare, can inflict 
catastrophic damage: an asteroid ten kilometers 
wide struck Earth 65 million years ago and 





In recent decades scientific understanding of the 
asteroid and comet population has grown, 
prompting efforts to protect the planet from a 
devastating collision.  Known as ‘planetary 
defense,’ these efforts encompass locating and 
tracking threatening bodies as well as developing 
means for mitigating a potential impact.  The 
general concept is to identify a threatening space 
object many years in advance and then deflect it, 
by changing its velocity, or fragment it into 
smaller pieces.  Theoretically, mitigating potential 
impacts of small and mid-sized bodies – those up 
to 1000 meters in diameter – could be 
accomplished using non-explosive means, 
although the largest asteroids or those detected 
shortly before impact might only be deflected or 
fragmented using the explosive power of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
                                                          
5
 Clark Chapman and Ed Lu, “FAQ on the Chelyabinsk 
Meteor Impact,” B612 Foundation, February 18, 2013, 




 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of 
Alternatives, Report to Congress, March 2007, 6. 
7
 Walter Alvarez, T. Rex and the Crater of Doom (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1997), 3-6. 
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ASSESSING THE THREAT 
Each asteroid and comet is unique in its 
composition, shape, size, and orbit.  While most 
small asteroids are solid masses, many larger 
asteroids are a collection of smaller bodies held 
together by a weak gravitational bond, akin to an 
orbiting pile of rubble.  Other asteroids are known 
as binaries, with two bodies gravitationally 
associated with one another.
8
   Typically, asteroids 
are composed of iron, carbon, or silica.  
Conversely, the nuclei of comets consist of frozen 
gases and dust.  As they approach the Sun, the 
gases in the comet’s nucleus evaporate and create 
the signature tail that often can be observed from 
Earth.  Some comets have exhausted the store of 
frozen gases in their core and consist primarily of 
asteroid-like materials; from a distance it often is 
impossible to distinguish between these extinct 
comets and true asteroids.
9
    
 
Asteroids originated from the failed formation of 
a rocky planet billions of years ago.  Fragments of 
the planet remained in orbit around the Sun and, 
over the eons, suffered millions of collisions, 
breaking into smaller pieces.  Most asteroids orbit 
the Sun once each 4-5 years and many have had 
their orbit changed through collision or, more 
likely, by the gravitational influence of Jupiter and 
other bodies.
10
  Alternatively, comets originate 
from deeper in space.  Most short-period comets 
emanate from the Kuiper Belt, located beyond 
Neptune, and have an orbital period of up to 200 
years, while long-period comets hail from the 
Oort Cloud, a band of debris at the furthest 
reaches of the solar system, and can take between 
200 and several thousand years to conduct one 




Of the small percentage of asteroids that do not 
orbit in the main asteroid belt, scientists have 
discovered more than 12,000 that will pass within 
1.3 Astronomical Units, or 200 million kilometers 
                                                          
8
 Roger Dymock, Asteroids and Dwarf Planets (New 
York: Springer, 2010), 33-35. 
9
 Lewis, 42-43. 
10
 Martin Rees, ed., Universe: The Definitive Visual 
Guide (New York: DK Books, 2005), 170-172. 
11
 Eicher, 9. 
of the Sun.
12
  These have been dubbed ‘Near 
Earth Asteroids’ and together with a much smaller 
population of comets are categorized as ‘Near 
Earth Objects’ (NEO).
13
  Based on a variety of 
orbital characteristics, most NEOs pose no threat 
as they will never intersect Earth’s track through 
space; only about one-fifth of NEOs will approach 
within 0.05 Astronomical Units (eight million 
kilometers) of Earth’s orbit.  These asteroids and 
comets are classified as ‘Potentially Hazardous 
Objects’ (PHO) and are the focus of planetary 





The kinetic energy imparted to Earth from an 
asteroid or comet collision is determined by the 
mass and relative velocity of the impacting body.  
Because mass cannot be known with certainty for 
most asteroids or comets, rough estimates of 
potential damage are based on the physical size of 
the object.  Smaller asteroids, between one and 30 
meters in diameter, typically do not have 
sufficient mass to complete the journey through 
Earth’s atmosphere and burn up, disintegrate, or 
explode before reaching the planet’s surface.  
Such asteroid explosions are known as ‘bolides’ 
and typically create a large fireball.  The shock 
wave from an aerial explosion is often large 
enough to cause damage on the ground, as seen in 
February 2013, when an asteroid estimated at 15-
20 meters in diameter exploded over Chelyabinsk, 
Russia, injuring more than 1000 people.
15
  
Detection of these small asteroids is extremely 
difficult and less than 0.01 percent have been 
located; because they pose a limited threat, 
planetary defense efforts typically do not focus on 
                                                          
12
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
“Near Earth Object Program,” National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, March 22, 2015, accessed 
March 22, 2015, http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats/. 
13
 William Ailor, “Planetary Defense Conferences: 
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(paper presented at the meeting of the Working Group 
on Near Earth Objects of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, February 2011), 
4. 
14
 Lindley Johnson, “Near Earth Object Observations 
Program” (paper presented to the Planetary Defense 
Task Force, Cambridge, MA, April 15, 2010), 3. 
15
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asteroids below 30 meters in diameter.
16
 
It is the larger asteroids and comets that concern 
planetary defense practitioners, particularly the 
objects of intermediate size that have not yet been 
located, but could produce significant damage to 
Earth.  A prime example is the asteroid or comet 
that exploded over Tunguska, Russia in June 1908.  
This celestial body, estimated at 40 meters in 
diameter, disintegrated and exploded over a 
heavily wooded area, creating a tremendous shock 
wave that flattened 2000 square kilometers of 
forest, as shown in Figure 1 – a blast nearly 200 
times more powerful than those of the nuclear 
bombs used in World War II.
17
  Had the Tunguska 
object exploded over a populated area hundreds if 
not thousands of lives could have been lost. 
 
Asteroids between 30-100 meters in diameter are 
known colloquially as ‘city killers’ and could 
devastate a small region on Earth, as vividly 
demonstrated in Tunguska.  Larger 100-300 meter 
‘nation killer,’ 300-1000 meter ‘continent killer,’ 
and 1000-plus meter ‘civilization killer’ objects 
would inflict proportionally more damage: a 
massive crater created by the impact of a five-
kilometer wide asteroid is depicted in Figure 2.  
The even larger asteroid that struck near the 
Yucatan Peninsula 65 million years ago – one of 
several known mass extinction events in the 
history of Earth – generated a global cataclysm of 
tsunamis, earthquakes, and fire.   The thick shroud 
of smoke and debris created by the collision 
encircled the globe for hundreds of years and 
snuffed out nearly three-quarters of all living 
species on the planet.
18
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 Benjamin Deniston, “2013 Planetary Defense 
Conference: Rising to the Challenge,” 21
st
 Century 
Science & Technology (Summer 2013): 29. 
17
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
“The Tunguska Impact – 100 Years Later,” NASA 




 Lynn Yaris, “Alvarez Theory on Dinosaur Die-Out 
Upheld: Experts Find Asteroid Guilty of Killing the 
Dinosaurs,” Berkeley Lab, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 
March 9, 2010, accessed June 25, 2014, 
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-
stories/2010/03/09/alvarez-theory-on-dinosaur/ and 
John Kunich, “Planetary Defense: the Legality of 
 
Many of the more than 12,000 NEOs detected so 
far are large asteroids.   Ongoing surveys of outer 
space have located roughly 95 percent of the 
estimated population of 900 civilization-
threatening asteroids that pass near Earth’s orbit.  
As the size of threatening asteroids decreases, 
however, the percentage of those that have been 
detected also decreases.  Of the 4800 continent 
killer PHOs estimated to be in existence, roughly 
half have been found, and only ten percent of 
nation killers have been located.  As for the 
smaller yet still dangerous city killers, of which 
500,000 are believed to exist, only one percent 
have been identified.
19
  While thousands of 
comets have been discovered, the much longer 
period of their orbits creates a great deal of 





There is roughly a 50-50 probability that a city 
killer asteroid will strike Earth during an average 
human lifespan, and a much lower probability for 
an impact by a larger space object.  While the 
mean time between collisions from city killer 
asteroids is one or two centuries, the time between 
collisions with larger asteroids is measured in 
millennia, or even millions of years for those that 
can threaten mass extinction.
21
  Nonetheless, the 
data available to forecast future threats is 
extremely limited and there is no way to ascertain 
with any degree of precision when the next major 
asteroid or comet collision will occur.   There is 
no scientific doubt that Earth will face the hazard 
of a devastating asteroid or comet impact at some 
unknown point in the future. 
 
COLLISION MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
A number of different methods have been 
posited for preventing an asteroid or comet from 
colliding with Earth.  These proposed methods 
could be employed independently or in tandem.  
                                                                                          





 Hans Rickman, “Current Questions in Cometary 
Dynamics,” in Comets II, ed. M.C. Festou, H.U. Keller, 
and H.A. Weaver (Tucson: the University of Arizona 
Press, 2004), 205-206. 
21
 National Research Council, 19. 
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Three key variables will help guide the selection 
of the appropriate response to a predicted strike: 
the time until impact and the size and composition 
of the asteroid or comet.  Other factors such as the 
amount of spin or the shape of the asteroid may 




Potential mitigation techniques using existing 
technology – or technology that can be modified 
for planetary defense in a short time span – can be 
placed into three general categories: ‘slow push’ 
methods, kinetic impacts, and nuclear strikes.  
Most of these methods are designed to deflect the 
asteroid by changing its velocity so that it passes 
Earth harmlessly.  The earlier a deflection can be 
undertaken, the less total change in velocity will 
be necessary.  For interventions more than a 
decade in advance of the collision, a change of 
only about one centimeter per second typically is 
sufficient.
23
   In addition to deflection techniques, 
another mitigation method is to fragment the 





The ‘slow push’ methods span a variety of 
techniques that could, in theory, deflect most city 
and nation killer asteroids, both solid and porous, 
provided the threat was detected one or more 
decades in advance.  Lasers or concentrated solar 
rays could be beamed onto the asteroid, causing 
surface material to burn off while generating a 
small counterforce; one concept would employ a 
series of large Earth-orbiting satellites to harness 
sunlight for this purpose.
25
  A second method 
                                                          
22
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the 2011 IAA Planetary Defense Conference, 
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would employ robotic spacecraft to hover close to 
the asteroid so that the slight gravitational 
attraction between the two bodies would, over 
several years, alter the asteroid’s velocity.  Other 
proposed methods would attach rocket motors to 
the surface of the asteroid, modify the albedo of a 
rotating asteroid to change the amount of photon 
re-radiation, or mine the asteroid’s surface, 
ejecting materials at high speed – all to produce a 





Kinetic impacts would involve flying a spacecraft 
into the asteroid to impart, through the collision, 
sufficient kinetic energy to alter the asteroid’s 
velocity.  Technologically, this is the simplest 
mitigation technique and is likely to be the 
preferred option for protecting against smaller 
threatening bodies, or in cases where multiple 
decades are available to deflect asteroids up to 
1000 meters in diameter.
27
  Depending on the size 
of the asteroid and the time before impact, 
however, a number of kinetic strikes might be 
necessary.  Kinetic strikes would be most 
effective against solid objects but far less useful 
for altering the velocity of porous bodies or 
‘rubble pile’ asteroids.
28
  Kinetic strikes designed 
to eject a maximum amount of surface material 
from the asteroid or comet into space would most 




Nuclear strikes may be the only available option 
for mitigating the threat of a larger asteroid or 
where there is little time between initial detection 
and the expected collision with Earth.
30
  Explosive 
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force from a nuclear weapon could create, in an 
instant, sufficient kinetic energy to alter the 
velocity of all but the largest asteroids.  The 
immense power of a nuclear device detonated on, 
near, or under the surface of a threatening space 
object could deliver several orders of magnitude 
more force, in one instant, than the kinetic impact 
or slow push techniques.
31
  Alternatively, a 
nuclear explosion could be used to break the 
asteroid into thousands of pieces, so that only a 
small percentage of the object’s mass would strike 
the atmosphere.   
 
The explosive yield of a nuclear weapon is vastly 
greater than that of an equivalent size of 
conventional, chemical explosive, such as the 
commonly used trinitrotoluene (TNT).  The first 
nuclear weapon – a plutonium fission device 
exploded during the Trinity test in July 1945 – 
had an explosive yield estimated at 20,000 tons 
(20 kilotons) of TNT.  Seven years later, the first 
thermonuclear fusion bomb was tested and 
yielded 10,400,000 tons (10.4 megatons) of 
explosive energy.  The largest nuclear weapon 
ever demonstrated was a Soviet device exploded 
in October 1961.  Dubbed Tsar Bomba, it 
produced more than 50 megatons of energy.  
Small, battlefield tactical nuclear weapons were 
fielded by both the U.S. and the USSR, with 
yields often in the single kilotons; modern fission 
devices tested by India, Pakistan, and North Korea 




There is an ample stockpile of nuclear devices 
potentially suitable for a planetary defense 
mission.  The United States currently possesses 
around 7100 nuclear weapons, 2080 of which are 
strategically deployed and the remainder of which 
are in storage, reserve, or awaiting dismantlement.  
U.S. nuclear weapons are designed as bombs, to 
be dropped on target by aircraft, or warheads, to 
be launched aboard land-based or submarine-
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based ballistic missiles.  While larger weapons 
were developed, currently the maximum yield in 
the U.S. arsenal is around one megaton, with most 
weapons designed to yield 100-500 kilotons.
33
  
Russia has a similar number of nuclear weapons, 
with about 1640 deployed, several thousand in 
reserve or awaiting dismantlement, and 2000 with 
tactical yields.  Other major nuclear powers 
include France, with less than 300 operational 
weapons; China, with about 240 warheads; Great 
Britain, with a total stockpile of around 225; and 





EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The general concept for a planetary defense 
mission using a nuclear weapon would be to 
launch a warhead aboard a rocket capable of 
interplanetary travel, to intercept the threatening 
body at the optimal spot in its orbit in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of the deflection or 
fragmentation.  The nuclear device could be 
detonated in one of three configurations: as a 
stand-off blast above the surface, on the surface, 
or beneath the surface of the asteroid or comet.
35
  
One concept for a nuclear explosive asteroid 
interceptor is shown in Figure 3.  
 
A stand-off blast could be used for deflection, as it 
would provide a massive force to alter the object’s 
trajectory while minimizing the possibility of 
fracturing.  In comparison to surface or sub-
surface blasts, a stand-off detonation would 
require a less sophisticated intercept maneuver 
and could be accomplished using a simpler 
delivery system.  The nuclear device would be 
maneuvered close to the asteroid, notionally to a 
height equal to 25 percent of the asteroid’s radius 
and above a specific hemisphere of the asteroid to 
                                                          
33
 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US 
nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic 




 Daryl Kimball, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What 
at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, February 




 Holsapple, 123-125. 
 Howe / Planetary Defense 10 
enhance the deflective force.
36
  Upon detonation, 
the thermal impulse and nuclear radiation 
generated in the explosion would be absorbed by 
surface materials, which would instantly heat up 
or vaporize.
37
  This would peel off a layer of rock 
and eject it into space, imparting a reactive force 
to alter the asteroid’s velocity.  Computer 
modeling has shown that a typical stand-off blast 
could ablate about one percent of an asteroid’s 
total mass.
38
  The higher above the surface the 
nuclear weapon was detonated, the thinner and 




In most cases the preferred direction of the 
velocity change would be along or directly 
opposite the asteroid’s orbital path, in order to 
change the period of the object’s revolution 
around the Sun and avoid the forecast collision 
with Earth.
40
  This concept of speeding up or 
slowing down the threatening body, rather than 
pushing it sideways, applies to all long-lead-time 
deflection techniques including slow push and 
kinetic impact methods.  However, for deflection 
missions that occur close to the time of collision 
with Earth – notionally when the asteroid is on its 
terminal orbit before impact – a sideways 
deflection using a large explosive force could be 




Surface and sub-surface blasts could be used 
either for deflection or fragmentation.  The most 
efficient transfer of energy from a nuclear weapon 
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to an asteroid would occur when the device was 
exploded beneath the surface of the object; in 
comparison to a stand-off blast a sub-surface 
detonation would transfer up to 100 times more 
energy.
42
  However, surface or sub-surface blasts 
would increase the possibility that a planned 
deflection would instead fragment the asteroid.  
To avoid this possibility, time permitting, an 
exploratory mission to the threatening asteroid or 
comet could ascertain its material composition 
and internal structure, and the most effective 





A surface or sub-surface blast would create a large 
crater and eject a mass of debris into space.  The 
deeper the sub-surface device was located, the 
more effectively energy would be imparted to the 
asteroid.  This is important for fragmentation 
missions where the threatening body would be 
blasted into thousands of smaller pieces.  One 
analysis found that for fragmentations conducted 
three or more years ahead of a projected impact, 
more than 99.999 percent of an asteroid’s original 




A difficult challenge for carrying out a sub-
surface burst involves placement of the nuclear 
device, particularly in circumstances with short-
lead time where the device must be transported 
directly to the asteroid at high velocity.  To assure 
effectiveness in fragmentation or deflection, the 
nuclear weapon must strike the asteroid at a 
precise impact angle and penetrate to the proper 
depth.  Unfortunately, a high velocity impact is 
likely to vaporize the nuclear device upon contact.  
To allow the nuclear warhead to burrow to the 
proper depth, a two-segment penetrator 
configuration could be employed.  As originally 
conceived by Russian researchers and refined at 
the Asteroid Deflection Research Center at Iowa 
State University, a hypervelocity nuclear 
interceptor could be comprised of a dual-bodied 
spacecraft, with the forward section serving as a 
kinetic impactor and the aft section containing the 
nuclear weapon.  Upon impact, the kinetic device 
would blast open a narrow crater in which the 
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nuclear device would explode microseconds later, 





The yield of the nuclear device needed for a 
planetary defense mission would depend on a 
variety of factors, such as the size and 
composition of the threatening body and the 
amount of velocity change desired.  To fully 
fragment a 1000-meter asteroid composed of 
silicate, research has shown that a nuclear 
explosion of 1.0 to 3.0 megatons is needed.  To 
deflect the same asteroid a decade or more in 
advance of projected collision, a 300-kiloton 
stand-off blast would suffice.
46
  Even successful 
fragmentation 15 days ahead of impact with Earth 





In planning planetary defense missions, a margin 
of safety must be included to account for orbital 
perturbations.  Although potential collisions with 
Earth can be estimated decades in advance, all 
objects traveling through space are subject to 
gravitational forces that can induce slight changes 
to their orbits.  As asteroids and comets pass 
through the solar system they may experience 
small but disruptive gravitational pull from the 
planets, other asteroids, or the Sun.
48
  The orbit of 
the asteroid Apophis is illustrative: it is projected 
to pass close to Earth in 2029 and 2036, but due to 
potential perturbations there are 146,500 
kilometers of positional uncertainty – 23 times the 
radius of the Earth – for the 2036 passage.
49
  
Should an asteroid like Apophis need to be 
deflected, the total change in velocity induced 
must alter the orbit so that the asteroid misses 
Earth by a distance greater than the sum of the 
uncertainties, plus an additional safety margin. 
 
Fully capable space launch systems will be 
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essential for any planetary defense operation.  As 
with nuclear weapons themselves, there currently 
are several space lift systems available, all of 
which have been rigorously tested, have proven 
reliability, and are capable of delivering the 
necessary nuclear device and support systems to 
intercept a threatening body.  For example, the 
Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle, used by the 
Department of Defense to place national security 
assets into orbit, is capable of transporting more 
than 8400 kilograms of payload on an 
interplanetary trajectory.  This is more lift 
capability than is needed to carry an American 
nuclear weapon, such as the B83 warhead, which 
weighs 1118 kilograms, along with requisite 
command, control, and telemetry systems.
50
  
        
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
The maturity of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
complex coupled with highly reliable and readily 
available space launch and control systems makes 
employment of a nuclear weapon for planetary 
defense a realistic option, with far less 
developmental risk than for the more exotic 
techniques that have been proposed.  Only the use 
of a kinetic impactor poses fewer technical 
hurdles.   
 
A nuclear mission would involve two basic acts: 
delivery of the weapon to the target, and the 
detonation.  Direct delivery was demonstrated 
successfully in the July 2005 Deep Impact 
mission, in which an American robotic spacecraft 
was flown purposefully into the Tempel 1 comet, 
seen in Figure 4.
51
  Nonetheless, new 
technological breakthroughs may be needed, 
particularly related to operating on or near the 
surface of an asteroid, for situations where a 
nuclear device would be placed on or buried 
beneath the asteroid’s surface before detonation.  
The recent difficulties encountered by the 
European Space Agency’s Philae spacecraft when 
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landing on and anchoring to Comet 
67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko highlight the 





Detonation has also been demonstrated.  Prior to 
agreeing to a ban on the practice, in July 1962 the 
U.S. successfully exploded a 1.4 megaton 
warhead more than 240 miles above the Earth in a 
test called Starfish Prime, and the Soviet Union 
conducted its own thermonuclear explosion at 
extremely high altitude that same year.
53
  These 
demonstrations quelled any doubts that a nuclear 
device would work in the harsh environment of 
space.  
 
Operationally, warning time is a key parameter for 
planetary defense missions.  With only a very 
small percent of the total population of potentially 
hazardous asteroids and comets currently known, 
it is very plausible that a threatening object will be 
discovered where there is little time for mitigation, 
in which case nuclear weapons may provide the 
only solution.  One way to preserve a larger menu 
of mitigation options is to detect, catalog, and 
track the full population of PHOs in the solar 
system as early as possible. 
 
While U.S. and international detection efforts 
have increased significantly over the past two 
decades, primarily through a network of civilian 
and government-operated observatories, the 
limitations of using terrestrial telescopes make 
this a very inefficient undertaking.
54
  A massive 
advantage could be gained by employing a space-
based telescope dedicated specifically for this 
purpose, as currently being planned by the 
nonprofit B612 Foundation, whose Sentinel 
spacecraft, scheduled for launch in 2018, is 
expected to identify up to 90 percent of all 
asteroids larger than 140 meters as well as a many 
                                                          
52
 Peter B. de Selding, “European Spacecraft Touches 
Down on Comet,” SpaceNews, November 12, 2014, 




 Gilbert King, “Going Nuclear Over the Pacific,” 




 National Research Council, 29-50. 
asteroids as small as 30 meters in diameter.
55
  
Even with a much more comprehensive survey, 
however, there will not be complete coverage of 
the asteroid population and the appearance of a 
threatening comet could occur at any time, since 
many comets are in orbits lasting multiple 
hundreds or thousands of years – again potentially 
necessitating the use of a nuclear explosion as a 
last ditch, short-notice defense. 
 
A second operational concern relates to the 
physical characteristics of many asteroids and 
comets.  It will be difficult to determine the proper 
blast location and nuclear yield to defend against 
rubble pile, oddly shaped, binary, and rapidly 
rotating bodies.  Further, for comets, the precise 
makeup of their nuclei is “among the more elusive 
questions of solar system science.”
 56
  An attempt 
to deflect or fragment a threatening comet using 
the enormous impact of a nuclear explosion may 
inadvertently create large fragments with 
negligible dispersal velocity, potentially leading to 
several devastating impacts on Earth.
57
  This 
supports the need for early detection as well as for 
conducting exploratory missions to threatening 
objects decades in advance of collision, in order to 
best ascertain their physical characteristics. 
 
A third issue regards the possibility that a 
deflection or fragmentation effort could shower 
Earth with radioactive materials.  The public has 
acute concerns over the dangers of radiation, 
which were on full display following the 2011 
disaster at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima, 
Japan.  From a scientific standpoint, the likelihood 
that any dangerous radiation from asteroid 
fragments or a poorly diverted object would pose 
a health threat on Earth is extremely small, and 
orders of magnitude less of a risk than posed by 
the fallout created during atmospheric testing of 
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nuclear weapons in the 1950s and early 1960s.
58
  
Nonetheless, dealing with public perceptions and 
the vocal opposition that is likely to arise will be a 
significant aspect of any effort to employ nuclear 
weapons for planetary defense. 
 
A final operational question surrounds command 
and control: what nation or nations will lead the 
mitigation effort against a threatening asteroid?  
Today, the answer is murky, as there are no 
agreed upon international conventions that 
directly address this issue.  The primary source of 
international space law, the 1967 Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer 
Space Treaty), is silent on the issue of planetary 
defense, but does include guidance that could be 
deemed applicable.  The treaty states as 
fundamental principles that the use of outer space 
is for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all 
mankind, and that international cooperation is 
highly desired, particularly “in the interest of 
international peace and security.”
59
  This language, 
which was written decades before planetary 
defense became an issue in space policymaking 
circles, could be interpreted as supporting an 
international effort to mitigate a known asteroid or 
comet collision threat.   
 
In 2013, in the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty 
and in reaction to the Chelyabinsk bolide, the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space chartered a working group to 
evaluate potential mitigation schemes.
60
  
Nonetheless, there is no assurance that should a 
threat be identified, the UN will be able to muster 
international support for a mitigation mission.  
There is likely to be squabbling over leadership of 
the project and nonproliferation concerns over 
safeguarding weapons secrets, should a nuclear 
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strike be the best or only option.  Under such 
circumstances it may fall upon the shoulders of 
the United States or a likeminded group of nations 
to carry out on their own initiative a planetary 
defense operation.  Since the 1990s, for example, 
Russia has made occasional overtures about 
working with the United States on nuclear 
planetary defense activities, although no concrete 





There are also significant political and legal issues 
related to the use of nuclear explosions for a 
planetary defense effort.  A plan to use nuclear 
weapons in space likely would face strident 
political and public opposition, based on the view 
that safer mitigation means would be available, 
and bolstered by restrictive language contained in 
the Outer Space Treaty.
62
  Article IV of the treaty 
states that nations shall not “place in orbit around 
the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or 
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, 
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station 
such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner.”
63
  Such unambiguous language makes 
no exception for defense of the planet.  To address 
this hurdle in the face of a known threat, the 
language of the Outer Space Treaty could be 
revised, the UN could pass a resolution to provide 
an exception for the mission at hand, or the 
involved nations could work outside the purview 
of the treaty – all solutions that are bound to 
generate controversy. 
 
In addition to the constraints of the Outer Space 
Treaty, other international agreements must be 
considered.  Public outcry over nuclear testing and 
other events helped lead the United States, USSR, 
and United Kingdom to sign the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty in 1963, which prohibited nuclear 
explosions in space, as well as in the atmosphere 
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and underwater.
64
  This was followed by an 
international effort to implement a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which 
prohibited nuclear testing anywhere (although this 
treaty has neither entered into force nor been 
ratified, the United States voluntarily ended all 
explosive nuclear testing in 1992).
65
  Should field 
testing or the use of a nuclear device for a 
planetary defense mission be necessary, it would 
require a significant change in U.S. policy, as well 
as that of other participating nuclear powers.   
 
In the legal arena, a government seeking to use 
nuclear weapons for planetary defense must be 
prepared to address liability concerns.  Under the 
Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Created by 
Space Objects, the nation that launches an object 
into outer space “shall be absolutely liable to pay 
compensation for damage caused by its space 
object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in 
flight.”
66
  This framework of strict liability could 
impact the decision to employ nuclear weapons, 
considering the tremendous financial risk for the 
launching state.   
 
This risk takes many forms: the damage created 
by a failed launch, should the nuclear warhead 
land back on Earth; an unsuccessful deflection 
mission, where the asteroid or comet strikes the 
planet in a different location than originally 
forecast; and a fragmentation mission where a 
large piece of the target survives atmospheric 
friction and impacts the surface.  To safeguard 
against liability hazards, a UN-chartered planetary 
defense mission could indemnify the launching 
and participating states from damages, or these 
states could choose to withdraw from the relevant 
treaties for the duration of the mission. 
 
A final, long-term challenge surrounds the 
aspirational goal espoused by many world leaders, 
including the sitting U.S. President, to rid the 
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planet of all nuclear weapons.
67
  With thousands 
of bombs, warheads, and tactical weapons in 
existence, there is little likelihood that complete 
nuclear disarmament will occur in the near future.  
Still, should international consensus develop over 
time to winnow the world’s nuclear arsenals, it is 
possible to foresee a future with drastically 
shrunken or completely expunged nuclear 
stockpiles. 
 
In such a future, there may come a juncture where 
an asteroid or comet has been detected on a 
collision course with Earth, the threat cannot be 
addressed by non-nuclear means, and no nuclear 
weapons are available for deflection or 
fragmentation.  This scenario would require the 
rebirth of a nuclear weapons complex and the 
development and manufacture of a new warhead – 
actions that could require critical time leading up 
to the projected impact.
68
  To avoid this fate, 
maintaining a level of nuclear weapons capability 
to address possible planetary defense needs should 




The threat from collision by asteroid or 
comet is not a short-term issue, but one that will 
forever shadow the human species.  There is no 
doubt that Earth will be struck by large asteroids 
or comets in the future.  Only the timing is 
unknown.   
 
No other currently feasible mitigation technique 
provides the high levels of energy needed for 
asteroid deflection or fragmentation as the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon.  While non-
nuclear slow push or kinetic impact methods may 
be suitable for smaller asteroids or those detected 
decades before collision, it is likely that a nuclear 
explosion will be the only adoptable solution for 
fending off the largest threatening bodies or where 
an inbound asteroid or comet is first identified 
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with little time before impact.  
 
For future generations, new technologies may 
displace nuclear weapons as a tool for planetary 
defense.  The use of directed beams of neutral 
particles could in theory be transmitted over 
extremely large distances to ablate the surface of 
an asteroid.  Chemical or biological compounds or 
mechanical ‘eaters’ might be developed to 
consume enough of an asteroid’s physical 
structure to render it harmless when it strikes the 
Earth’s atmosphere.  Equally compelling, should 
methods be devised to contain and store it, small 
quantities of anti-matter could be used either as a 
strong explosive or to propel the threatening body 




These techniques, however appealing in theory, 
are generations away from development, if at all.  
With today’s technology, it is a simple truth that 
the use of a nuclear device to prevent collision 
with Earth of a large asteroid or comet remains 
the most effective solution in a wide range of 
scenarios.  The operational, legal, political, and 
public perception challenges related to the use of 
nuclear weapons to defend against a hazardous 
space object are vast, but must be addressed and 
overcome if nuclear weapons become necessary 
for planetary defense. 
 
The development of nuclear weapons has been 
seen by many as a tragic turn in history, 
unleashing for the first time the potential power to 
destroy human civilization.  How extraordinary it 
would be, then, if a monstrous asteroid on a 
collision course with Earth – the same primordial 
force of nature that exterminated the dinosaurs 
and that today could eliminate humanity – was 
deflected from its orbit by the well-timed impulse 
of a man-made thermonuclear explosion.   
 
Rather than act as the destroyer of mankind, 
nuclear weapons would serve as its most vital 
defender. 
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Figure 1.  Trees felled by the 1908 Tunguska explosion.  Photo courtesy of the Leonid Kulik 
Expedition. 
Figure 2.  Aerial view of the Manicouagan impact crater, Quebec, Canada.  Roughly 100 
kilometers wide, this crater was created more than 200 million years ago when an asteroid 
estimated at five kilometers in diameter struck Earth.  Photo courtesy of NASA/Near Earth 
Object Program. 















Figure 3.  NASA nuclear interceptor concept, developed in 2007 and suitable for use in stand-off or 
surface detonations to deflect a threatening asteroid or comet.  The B83 warhead has a 
programmable yield of up to 1.2 megatons.  Image courtesy of NASA/Marshall Space Flight 
Center. 
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Figure 4.  Comet Tempel 1 after being struck by the Deep Impact space probe in July 
2005.  Photo courtesy of NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory.  
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Cyberwar: Clausewitzian Encounters 
 
Marco Cepik, Diego Rafael Canabarro, and Thiago Borne Ferreira 
As Clausewitz’s masterpiece suggests, language matters for how states conceptualize and plan for war.  
‘Cyberwar’, now on the lips of nearly every national security policymaker, may turn out to be a 
misnomer.  
 
The Digital Era and the spread of 
contemporary information and communication 
technologies (ICT) bring about different 
challenges for national and international security 
policymaking, heating up academic and political 
debate over the scope and the implications of an 
upcoming cyberwar.
1
 This article evaluates three 
well-known assertions related to this highly 
controversial issue. The first section defines the 
concept of cyberwar according to its original 
employment. The second section presents each 
controversial assertion synthesized from 
qualitative content analysis of selected academic 
publications, landmark documents, and news 
accounts. The three of them are, respectively: (a) 
cyberspace is a new operational domain for war; 
(b) cyber warfare can be as severe as conventional 
warfare; and (c) cyber warfare can be waged both 
by state and non-state actors. In the third section 
we evaluate them collectively through theoretical 
and empirical lenses. The final section 
consolidates findings, indicating paths for further 
inquiry and policy caveats. 
 
This text deliberately evokes an idea employed in 
the past by other accounts of the phenomenon 
(Tennant, 2009; Morozov, 2009; Greenemeier, 
2011; Valeriano; Maness, 2012). The reference 
has two justifications. First, it seeks to reconnect 
the concept of cyber warfare to its Clausewitzian 
roots, highlighting the ambiguous role of 
information in war and the need to treat 
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cyberspace as an integral part of the political and 
strategic realms, not as a completely separated 
domain. Second, it aims at the importance of 
careful evaluate propositions about the 
securitization of cyberspace. 
 
WHAT IS CYBERWAR? 
The book chapter entitled Cyberwar is 
coming! by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
(1997) is directly responsible for the formal 
incorporation of cyber to the lexicon of Security 
and Strategic Studies. According to the authors, “a 
case [existed] for using the prefix [from the Greek 
root kybernan, meaning to steer or govern, and a 
related word kybernetes, meaning pilot, governor, 
or helmsman] in that it bridges the fields of 
information and governance better than does any 
other available prefix or term,” such as, for 
instance, information warfare (Arquilla; Ronfeldt, 
1997:57). 
 
Information warfare should be treated as a 
subfield of larger information operations, which 
“comprise actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while 
defending one’s own information and information 
systems.” Information warfare is a more 
restrictive concept: it refers “to those information 
operations conducted during times of crisis or 
conflict intended to affect specific results against 
a particular opponent” (Schmitt, 1999:07).  
 
The broad concept of information operations 
includes electronic warfare (EW), psychological 
operations (PSYOPS), computer network 
operations (CNO), military deception, and 
operations security (Zimet; Barry, 2009:291). 
Because of the ambiguous role of information in 
war (Clausewitz, 2007, Book I, Chapter VI), 
“information operations have been recognized as a 
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distinct form of warfare meeting its own separate 




Therefore the use of the prefix “cyber” in this 
context was intended to comprise both the role of 
digital computers and computerized networks 
from a technological perspective as well as the 
organizational and institutional consequences of 
their application on information gathering, 
processing and sharing. The authors allegedly 
tried to catch-up with “some visionaries and 
technologists who [were] seeking new concepts 
related to the information revolution” (Arquilla; 
Ronfeldt, 1997:59). 
 
Basically, we agree with a conceptual definition 
of cyberwar that refers to the control of 
information-related factors in the preparation and 
waging of war. Cyberwar is conducted through 
the development and deployment of different 
technologies (increasingly robotic and digital in 
nature), as well as through the implementation of 
changes in military organization and doctrine. In 
this sense, “cyberwar is about organization as 
much as [it is about] technology” in order to “turn 
knowledge into capability” (Arquilla; Ronfeldt, 
1997:30). The same is valid today, with proper 
qualifications and caveats.  
 
Highlighting the societal implications of the 
information revolution
3
, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
                                                          
2
 Schmitt affirms that the terms information and 
information systems “shall be understood very 
expansively [...] The United States military defines 
information as ‘facts, data, or instructions in any 
medium or form' and an information system as the 
'entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and 
components that collect, process, store, transmit, 
display, disseminate, and act on information” (Schmitt, 
1999:07). 
3
 The whole field of Digital Era studies was influenced 
by The Rise of the Network Society (1996), where 
Manuel Castells first recognized that the "ability to use 
advanced information and communication technologies 
[…] requires an entire reorganization of society” to 
cope with the decentralized character of networks that 
give shape to societies in an information age (Castells, 
1999:03). Both cyberwars and netwars are founded 
upon the premise that ICTs entail networked forms of 
organization: the first category referring specifically to 
the military sector; the latter to the civilian sector at 
large. Nonetheless, the labeling of inherently non-
also introduced the broad concept of netwar: a sort 
of non-military information-related 
multidimensional conflict, that could be waged by 
state and non-state actors with a wide range of 
available tools (public diplomacy, propaganda, 
interference with local media, the control of 
computer networks and databases, etc.), with the 
purpose of “trying to disrupt, damage, or modify 
what a target population knows or thinks it knows 
about itself and the world around it” (Arquilla; 
Ronfeldt, 1997:28). According to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s framework, despite being non-military 
in essence, netwar campaigns may deal with 
military issues such as nuclear weapons, terrorism, 
etc. Netwars may also escalate to the level of 
cyberwars when they affect military targets. 
Moreover, they can be employed in parallel to 
both conventional and cyber war. 
 
More than twenty years later, cyber has become 
increasingly identified with the pervasiveness of 
cyberspace: “an operational domain whose 
distinctive and unique character is framed by the 
use of electronics and the electromagnetic 
spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange and 
exploit information via interconnected 
information-communication technology (ICT) 





In the military, information and intelligence 
operations, routine administrative functions, and a 
wide array of everyday jobs have been 
increasingly developed and transformed with the 
support of interconnected electro-electronic 
devices (Zimet; Barry, 2009; Libicki, 2012; Rid, 
2012a). The same applies to the civilian sector 
(Blumenthal; Clark, 2009; Kurbalija; Gelbstein, 
                                                                                          
military phenomena as “war” can also lead to 
unjustified events of securitization (Hansen; 
Nissenbaum, 2009). 
4
 It is interesting to note that cyberspace was not a 
defining character of cyberwars to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt. According to them cyberspace is “another 
new term that some visionaries and practitioners have 
begun using” to refer “to the new realm of electronic 
knowledge, information, and communications – parts 
of which exist in the hardware and software at specific 
sites, other parts in the transmissions flowing through 
cables or through air and space” (Arquilla; Ronfeldt, 
1997:59). 
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2005). In the last two decades cyberspace has 
been greatly enlarged mainly as a result of the 
steady growth and spread of the Internet and 
interrelated technologies (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013:v). Currently, the Internet is the main entry 
door for cyberspace, mainly because the 
convergence of “all modes of communication – 
voice, data, video, etc. – on the Internet platform” 
(Mueller, 2010:129) has gradually blurred the 
lines between cyberspace and the Internet. 
 
In this sense, the first decades of the 21st Century 
are defined by the growing importance of the 
technological and organizational aspects of 
cyberspace politics. Consequently, cyber-related 
issues increasingly permeate the agenda of 
national and international security (Weimann, 
2004; O’Harrow, 2005; Nissenbaum, 2005; 
Eriksson; Giacomello, 2007; Kramer; Starr, 2009). 
As examples, one could just mention the public 
debate around increasing reliance of criminal and 
terrorist organizations on Internet-based 
applications (e.g. the Web, electronic mail, chat 
servers, social networks); the major assaults on 
Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008) carried 
through Internet-based technologies and 
applications; the spread of malicious computer 
codes with unprecedented characteristics and 
outcomes, such as Stuxnet, Flame, and Gauss 
(2012); some alleged State-sponsored violations 
of sensitive political and economic databases, as 
well as public social networks profiles, such as the 
attacks reported by CitizenLab to computers 
associated with Dalai Lama (2008), the stealing of 
Sony movies and classified documents (2014), 
and the US Cyber Command Twitter account 
breach (2015); the Snowden affairs (2014), which 
publicized documented details of mass-
surveillance programs developed mainly by the 
US National Security Agency; and the actions of 
civil society organizations such as Wikileaks and 
Openleaks, as well as hacktivists groups that 
employ Internet applications as means for political 
activism, such as Anonymous and Lulzsec. 
 
Because of the need for promptly tackling these 
different perceived threats from a practical 
perspective, the theoretical notion of “cyber” as 
something related to the complex interactions 
between technology and networked governance 
has become subordinated to a narrow conception 
of “cyber” as something identified with the 
technical and tactical exploitation of cyberspace. 
As a detailed survey of the database compiled by 
Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society (The Berkman Cybesecurity Wiki) reveals, 
the bulk of intellectual background for policy and 
legal development has been mainly produced by 
security related governmental agencies and IT 
corporations. Of course, we have no feud against 
government or the private sector getting involved 
in public debates about cyber warfare. Our point 
here is to stress the need to take a broader, 
theoretically oriented, political and societal 
perspective when trying to assess the meaning of 
cyberspace for national and international security 
policymaking.  
 
More specifically, critical debate on basic 
concepts is crucial to avoid analogies without real 
theoretical or empirical grounds (Libicki, 2012). 
Therefore, it is a good sign that scholars recently 
began advancing more rigorous and consistent 
analyses of publicly known cyber events (Rid, 
2013; Deibert, 2013; Gray, 2013; Demchak, 2012). 
Their works question taken-for-granted normative 
propositions on cyberwar. At the same time, they 
delve into the severity and the sophistication of 
contemporary cyber operations of all sorts. 
 
THREE CONTROVERSIAL CLAIMS 
ABOUT CYBERWAR 
In order to contribute to a more balanced 
account of cyberwar, the following paragraphs 
summarize three common assertions related to the 
phenomenon. These three were selected from 
academic publications, landmark documents and 
news accounts covering the years 2012 and 2013.
5
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Our goal in debating them is not to dismiss them 
or prove them entirely false, but to call for a 
better-established scope of validity. After 
presenting each of them separately in this section, 
we shall discuss them collectively in the next 
section.   
 
“Cyberspace is a new operational domain for 
war” 
Referring to cyber-related incidents as 
warfare in the fifth domain has become a standard 
expression over the last ten years. “Cyberspace is 
a new theater of operations,” says the 2005 US 
National Defense Strategy. “As a doctrinal matter, 
the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace 
as a new domain of warfare […] just as critical to 
military operations as land, sea, air, and space,” 
wrote the former US Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William Lynn (2010) in Foreign Affairs. “Warfare 
has entered the fifth domain: cyberspace,” alerted 
The Economist in the same year (The Economist, 
2010). Indeed, comparable claims have been 
widely spread in the past years, and the idea has 
reached politicians, intellectuals, the military, and 
the media all around the globe.  
 
In 2012, the popular Argentinean DEF Magazine 
defined cyberspace as “a new battlefield” (Lucas, 
2012). The idea was reaffirmed by an Argentinean 
official in the same year: “electronic warfare 
relates to more traditional domains of conflict: 
land, sea, and air. Cyberwar is undertaken in a 
new domain of hostility among nation-states” 
(Uzal, 2012). 
 
“Cyber warfare can be as severe as conventional 
warfare” 
According to the 2010 Brazilian Green 
Book on Information Security, “natural threats 
(posed by forces of nature) or intentional ones 
(sabotage, crime, terrorism, and war) acquire a 
greater dimension when the use of cyberspace is 
involved”. During the III International Seminar on 
Cyber Defense held in Brasilia in 2012, the 
Brazilian Minister of Defense reaffirmed the idea, 
urging Brazil and other countries to get ready to 
face a new cyber-related threat capable of 
bringing harmful consequences to society at large. 
 
In 2011 the Washington Post reported: “a cyber 
attack against Libya […] could have disrupted 
Libya’s air defences but not destroyed them. For 
that job, conventional weapons were faster, and 
more potent. Had the debate gone forward, there 
also would have been the question of collateral 
damage. Damaging air defence systems might 
have, for example, required interrupting power 
sources, raising the prospect of the cyber weapon 
accidentally infecting other systems reliant on 
electricity, such as those in hospitals” (Nakashima, 
2011). 
 
One year later the same newspaper stated that 
“over the past decade, instances have been 
reported in which cyber tools were contemplated 
but not used because of concern they would result 
in collateral damage […] There is the danger of 
collateral damage to civilian systems, such as 
disrupting a power supply to a hospital” 
(Washington Post, 2012). 
 
The already mentioned Argentinean DEF 
Magazine also suggested in 2012 that “a new sort 
of conflict is dominating the world stage: 
cyberwar. It doesn’t matter the size and the 
available resources of the opponents. With an 
adequate IT capacity, the aftermath can be lethal 
and irreparable” (Noro, 2012). 
 
“Cyber warfare can be waged both by state and 
non-state actors” 
The 2003 US National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace alerts: “because of the increasing 
sophistication of computer attack tools, an 
increasing number of actors are capable of 
launching nationally significant assaults against 
our infrastructures and cyberspace.” This notion is 
further developed by the 2012 DoD Priorities for 
21st Century Defense: “both state and non-state 
actors possess the capability and intent to conduct 
cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on 
the United States, with possible severe effects on 
both our military operations and our homeland”. 
 
Harvard Law School Professor, Jack Goldsmith, 
summarizes these perceptions as follows: 
 
“Taken together, these factors – our 
intimate and growing reliance on 
computer systems, the inherent 
vulnerability of these systems, the 
network’s global nature and capacity for 
23 Space & Defense  
 
near instant communication (and thus 
attack), the territorial limits on police 
power, the very high threshold for 
military action abroad, the anonymity that 
the Internet confers on bad actors, and the 
difficulty anonymity poses for any 
response to a cyber attack or cyber 
exploitation – make it much easier than 
ever for people outside one country to 
commit very bad acts against computer 
systems and all that they support inside 
another country. On the Internet, states 
and their agents, criminals and criminal 
organizations, hackers and terrorists are 
empowered to impose significant harm on 
computers anywhere in the world with a 
very low probability of detection” 
(Goldsmith, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, Dorothy Denning, Professor at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, is more doubtful. 
She contends that: 
 
“There are several factors that contribute 
to a sense that the barriers to entry for 
cyber operations are lower than for other 
domains. These include remote execution, 
cheap and available weapons, easy-to-use 
weapons, low infrastructure costs, low 
risk to personnel, and perceived 
harmlessness. [...] Cyber weapons are 
cheap and plentiful. Indeed, many are free, 
and most can be downloaded from the 
Web. Some cost money, but even then the 
price is likely to be well under 
US$ 100,000. By comparison, many 
kinetic weapons, for example, fighter jets, 
aircraft carriers, and submarines, can run 
into the millions or even billions of 
dollars. Again, however, there are 
exceptions. Custom-built software can 
cost millions of dollars and take years to 
develop, while kinetic weapons such as 
matches, knives, and spray paint are 
cheap and readily available” (Denning, 
2009). 
 
As core propositions in the current debate 
regarding cyberwar, the three claims just 
presented cannot either be accepted or dismissed 
without strong empirical and logical tests, both 
beyond the scope of this article. However, in order 
to better define their scope of validity and the 
risks involved in accepting them as unqualified 
truth, we shall evaluate them collectively from the 
standpoint of a scientific research program such as 
Clausewitz's theory of war. 
 
TOWARDS A CLAUSEWIZIAN CONCEPT 
OF CYBERWAR 
We shall depart from Betz’s perception 
that cyberwar is a “portmanteau of two concepts”: 
“cyberspace and war, which are themselves 
undefined and equivocal; it takes one complex 
non-linear system and layers it on another 
complex non-linear system […] As a result, it 
does not clarify understanding of the state of war 
today; it muddies waters that were not very 
transparent to start with” (2012:692). Hence we 
need to clearly define each concept before 
integrating them, starting with cyberspace. 
 
Allow us to recall Kuehl’s (2009) definition 
presented in the first section: cyberspace is 
“framed by the use of electronics and the 
electromagnetic spectrum.” It is employed “to 
create, store, modify, exchange and exploit 
information via interconnected information-
communication technology (ICT) based systems 
and their associated infrastructures.” Despite 
one’s natural impetus to interpret interconnected 
ICTs as synonymous with Internet, cyberspace is 
a much more complex environment composed by 
many different systems. “At the very least yours, 
theirs, and everyone else’s”, says Libicki 
(2012:326). 
 
Considering hypothetical actors A and B, this idea 
can be represented in graphical terms, as in  
Figure 1. 
 
Both actors own closed (air-gapped) information 
systems (represented on circles A.1 and B.1); they 
also own systems (circles A.2 and B.2) that more 
or less overlap with global open communications 
backbones (GOBC) such as telecom lines, the 
radio spectrum, the Internet, etc. (represented on 
circle GOBC.3). Naturally, A and B can also have 
overlapping systems between themselves and/or 
between each one and other actors (circles A.3, 
B.3, and C.3). These systems can also be more or 
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less connected to global open communications 
backbones (in this case, directly through B.3). 
 
All of these systems – mounted over a variable set 
of infrastructure, logical, and application layers – 
can be some way or another interconnected. The 
interconnection can be permanent and 
synchronous (such as in the case of Internet-based 
connections), as well as intermittent and 
asynchronous (such as in the case of software 
updating or in the use of a flash drive to exchange 
information between computers). Even when there 
are no digital bridges that allow access to a 
specific system, the isolation “can be defeated by 
those willing to penetrate physical security 
perimeters or by the insertion of rogue 
components. But efforts to penetrate air-gapped 
systems are costly and do not scale well” (Libicki, 
2012:326). 
 
As stated before, society relies on the correct 
performance of information systems for a myriad 
of more or less vital purposes. As man-made 
creations, information systems, and consequently 
cyberspace, have inherent flaws and 
vulnerabilities (Stamp, 2011; Kim; Solomon, 
2010). Thus, the more one relies on them, the 
more it is potentially threatened by the eventual 
exploitation of the systems’ vulnerabilities. 
 
Nonetheless, we agree with Martin Libicki (2012) 
in highlighting that cyberspace is not a domain 
that can be isolated from others exactly due its 
pervasiveness to all human activities. In this sense, 
cyberspace can be treated as a separated 
warfighting domain only for logistical and 
command and control purposes, and even this 
trend could be argued against. However, it is more 
important to accurately communicate to the armed 
forces and the citizens that physical and logical 
realities of cyberspace are much harder to separate 
from land, water, air, and outer space than each of 
these other four domains can be separated from 
each other. Moreover, the whole concept of 
jointness depends, to become reality, on 
acknowledging the pervasiveness of cyberspace.  
 
Since it is not correct to fully equate Internet with 
cyberspace, or treat cyberspace as something that 
can be isolated from the whole contemporary 
social fabric, there are operational implications 
when war reaches cyberspace. As Martin Libicki 
said regarding his conceptual framework for 
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities: 
 
“The more these tasks require correct 
working of the systems, the greater the 
potential for disruption or corruption that 
can be wreaked by others. Similarly, the 
more widely connected the information 
systems, the larger the population of those 
who can access such systems to wreak 
such havoc. Conversely, the tighter the 
control of information going into or 
leaving information systems, the lower 
the risk from the threat” (Libicki, 
2012:323). 
 
Following this idea, offensive actions in 
cyberspace aim at exploiting systems’ flaws and 
vulnerabilities to “interfere with the ability of 
their victims to carry out military or other tasks, 
such as production” (Libicki, 2012:323). It is in 
essence a matter of reconnaissance, exploration, 
and exploitation of an opponent’s entire 
infrastructure, organization, personnel, and 
components that collect, process, store, transmit, 
display, disseminate, and act on information. 
 
Defense, on the other hand, involves a complex 
set of preventive and reactive actions in order to 
secure the systems (Clark; Levin, 2009). They 
comprise engineering and organizational decisions 
related to the situational environment, the set of 
technologies employed, and the degree of 
connectivity (to other systems) and openness (to a 
range of users) of a specific system. They also 
involve the permanent monitoring of the 
information flowing through the system, and its 
operation and functioning according to given 
parameters. 
 
To be effective, the exploration/infiltration phase 
of a given attack has to be supplemented by the 
development of other code-based tools for 
disrupting the infiltrated system. However, the 
window of opportunity for infiltration and 
disruption is generally very narrow after 
vulnerability is discovered. Once an attack is 
detected, the target system can be adapted to 
tackle the threat. The number of different 
information systems and their potential lack of 
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structural uniformity (shown in Figure 1) mean 
that the strategic preponderance of defense over 
offense is not easily overturned. In other words, 
there are so many engineering options available 
for information systems’ designers that the 
development of cyber offense capabilities might 
be way too expensive and ineffective to be 
translated into a strategic advantage.   
 
In this sense, most offensive cyber actions are 
hard to repeat in patterned operational fashion: 
“once the target understands what has happened to 
its system in the wake of an attack, the target can 
often understand how its system was penetrated 
and close the hole that let the attack happen” 
(Libicki, 2012:323). Furthermore, as sensitive ICT 
systems generally entail great amounts of 
customization, the development of ready-made, 
mass-produced cyber weapons might be useful 
only for a few publicly open interoperable 
systems. The development of custom cyber 
weapons not only demands great amounts of 
resources (intelligence, funding, working-hours, 
etc.), but also means that the more customized the 
cyber weapon, the narrower its scope of 
application (Rid, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, one might still affirm that the 
greater the Internet reliance, the greater the 
homogeneity of IT solutions and the greater the 
risks inherent to interconnectivity. Despite the 
suggestion that interconnectivity can lead to 
systemic hazardous events, vital information 
systems tend to be – and are increasingly 
becoming – more and more redundant and 
resilient (Sommer; Brown, 2011). 
 
Actually, there is no such thing as a static 
cyberspace, neither in physical (infrastructure) nor 
in virtual (code) terms. To borrow a Clausewitzian 
term, cyberspace is a chameleon: its mutations 
depend on the decisions taken by individual 
information systems’ owners. Therefore, calling 
cyberspace an operational domain without proper 
qualification entails the risk of overshadowing the 
inherent malleability of its components and 
consequently stresses the need of deploying 
permanent and vigilant tools for “perimeter” 
monitoring instead of making safety and security 
engineering/governance a priority when it comes 
to defense. 
 
When it comes to offense, the development of 
general-purpose capabilities also needs to be 
balanced against the political and economic costs 
of exploiting (physically and digitally) the bulk of 
other actors’ systems, as highlighted by the 
Snowden affair and the following diplomatic 
chorus of disapproval. This is not to say that 
cyberspace is not relevant for security and defense 
policymaking. On the contrary, it is a way to mind 
the fact that a large amount of resources might 
have been applied to suboptimal alternatives for 
ensuring national security – due to the hubris 
involved in treating as a self-contained operational 
domain something as ubiquitous and pervasive as 
cyberspace. That trend might be even more severe 
during times of economic or political distress, and 
might have negative outcomes if great powers 
develop a preemptive approach towards each 
other and third countries. 
 
Regarding the second claim, that cyberwar can be 
as severe as conventional warfare; we first need to 
define the concept of war. According to 
Clausewitz, (1) war is never an isolated act, (2) 
war does not consist of a single blow, and (3) in 
war the result is never final (Clausewitz, 2007:17-
19). Furthermore, as Clausewitz (2007:13) also 
reminds us, “war is […] an act of force to compel 
our enemy to do our will”. The ultimate 
consequence of this prerogative is that war is 
necessarily violent. Potential or actual use of force, 
in Clausewitz’s thinking, is the fundamental 
aspect of all war. Actually, violence plays a 
central role in his 'wondrous trinity' (wunderliche 
Dreifaltigkeit), which is made up of reason, 
natural force, and chance. The unifying concept of 
war in Clausewitz encompasses singular motives 
and dynamics that yet form an indivisible whole 
(Echevarria, 2007:69-70).  
 
From a material point of view, every act of war is 
always instrumental to its ends. There has to be a 
means – physical violence or the threat of force – 
and there has to be an end – to impose one’s will 
on the enemy. To achieve the end of war “the 
opponent has to be brought into a position, against 
his will, where any change of that position 
brought about by the continued use of arms would 
bring only more disadvantages for him, at least in 
that opponent’s view” (Rid, 2012a:08). In this 
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sense, actual violence in actual wars does not 
easily escalate towards the logically possible 
extreme because of its instrumental and 
interactive nature. 
 
Denial of service attacks such as those perpetrated 
by groups like Anonymous to take down or deface 
websites tend to be easily remedied or 
counteracted by the victims. And the bulk of 
scams that have been happening in the last years 
through ICT systems do not aim at exercising 
political power over an enemy, but only to exploit 
information for illegal commercial purposes. 
Intelligence related operations through cyberspace 
are obviously related to power struggles, but they 
are not warfare. In short, no testified cyber attack 
has ever caused a single casualty, injured a person, 
or severely damaged physical infrastructure. 
Taking this very characteristic alone before 
analyzing Clausewitz’s prerogatives further, it 
seems exaggerated (or at least precipitate) to treat 
code-triggered consequences as equal to kinetic 
violence. “Violence in cyberspace is always 
indirect”, says Rid (2012b).  
 
It means that ICT systems first have to be 
weaponized in order to produce physical and 
functional damage to people, infrastructure, and 
organizations. One could arguably say that code 
weaponizing is exactly what is happening right 
now in the realm of international security; 
physical harm would be only a matter of time or 
disclosure about what is going on. Maybe, but 
empirical public evidence so far does not 




Besides, it is hard to sustain at this point that any 
cyber attack reported so far has irrefutably forced 
the target to accept the offender’s will. 
Nonetheless, that might not be the case if one 
considers the potential massive social-
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 To be fair, Thomas C. Reed’s memoir book At the 
Abyss (2005) describes how an American covert 
operation allegedly used malicious software to cause an 
explosion in Russia’s Urengoy–Surgut–Chelyabinsk 
pipeline back in 1982. The incident might have caused 
casualties, even though there are no media reports, 
official documents, or similar accounts to confirm 
Reed’s allegation. Also, it is not settled whether the 
Stuxnet attack caused destruction to the Iranian nuclear 
centrifuges, or if it only rendered them inoperative. 
psychological risk inherent to the consequences of 
having governmental and banking web servers 
shutdown; personal and financial data stolen from 
cloud computing providers; SCADA systems 
unexpectedly operating anomalously without 
proper technical explanation as they did in the 
Stuxnet event; things from satellites to webcams 
and computer speakers turning on and off 
randomly and without direct user control, etc. 
 
As Thomas Rid recognizes: “Cyber attacks, both 
non-violent as well as violent ones, have a 
significant utility in undermining social trust in 
established institutions, be they governments, 
companies, or broader social norms. Cyber attacks 
are more precise than more conventional political 
violence: they do not necessarily undermine the 
state’s monopoly of force in a wholesale fashion. 
Instead they can be tailored to specific companies 
or public sector or organizations and used to 
undermine their authority selectively” (Rid, 
2013:26). 
 
The reiteration and persistence of non-violent 
cyber attacks (in isolation or in combination with 
other offensive activities short of war), coupled 
with the ever going preparation for responding to 
and retaliating cyber attacks in different political 
playing fields could escalate tensions up to the 
point of full-blown violent conflict. This 
possibility, as logical as it may be, has to be 
reconciled with some empirical corroboration 
before any government or armed force start to 
treat cyber incidents as equivalent of using kinetic 
or direct-energy weapons. 
 
Finally, there is the risk of treating “the cyber” as 
another technological tool that would easily give 
the offensive a brutal advantage in war. 
“Technology has always driven war, and been 
driven by it [...] and yet the quest for 
technological superiority is eternal”, explains Van 
Creveld (2007). For instance, in the 1930s and 
1940s, air force superiority was thought to be the 
decisive feature for winning a war. In the 1990s, 
air force superiority was coupled with 
microelectronics in the development of precision-
guided ammo, which would avoid the excessive 
loss of money and lives in war. The development 
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) follows that 
trend. “The problem is that when [people] talk of 
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‘stand-alone’ cyberwars they are arguing a theory 
of a new form of war in which decisive results are 
achieved without triggering the thorny problem of 
escalation” – says Betz (2012:696). 
 
Against the idea of a “cyber silver bullet” stands 
Clausewitz’s third fundamental element of war: its 
political and interactive nature. According to him, 
warfare is “the continuation of politics by other 
means” (Clausewitz, 2007:28) because politics is 
the ever-open interaction of wills among 
individuals and political entities with potential 
contradictory ends, whatever constitutional form 
such polities may have. Individuals, groups, and 
polities have intentions (or emotional desires) to 
be transmitted to (and understood by) the 
adversary at some point during the conflict.  
 
In contrast, Richard Clarke (2010:67-68), for 
instance, describes a hypothetical overwhelming 
cyber attack on the United States “without a single 
terrorist or soldier ever appearing”. Addressing 
Stuxnet, Michael Gross wrote for Vanity Fair in 
April 2011: “[this] is the new face of 21st-century 
warfare: invisible, anonymous, and devastating”. 
This brings us back to the problem of attribution 
and to the third controversy, regarding state and 
non-state actors alike being able to wage cyber 
warfare. 
 
There is no doubt some cyber incidents are hard to 
publicly attribute to a specific actor, even if many 
have been increasingly political in nature or 
indirectly connected to political events. The Web 
War in Estonia is allegedly related to the 
government’s discretionary removal of a Soviet-
era statue from downtown Tallinn. The cyber 
attacks against Georgian official websites 
preceded the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Some 
other attacks present political motivation, having 
been carried on by groups such as Anonymous, 
LulzSec, and others. The “Operation Payback”, so 
far the largest operation coordinated by 
Anonymous, was aimed at disrupting online 
services of organizations that work in favor of 
copyright and anti-piracy policies, such as the 
Swedish Prosecution Authority, the Motion 
Pictures Association of America (MPAA), the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI), the Recording Industry Association of 
America, a large number of Law Firms, as well as 
individual American politicians, like Gov. Sarah 
Palin or Sen. Joseph Lieberman. That operation 
escalated to “Operation Avenge Assange” and 
started targeting the different companies and 
governments involved in the financial siege 
imposed on Wikileaks and the criminal 
prosecution unleashed against Julian Assange. 
The operations comprised website defacements, 
distributed denial of services attacks, leaks of 
classified information, and so on. 
 
But they have not been translated into violent acts 
of any nature. Also, it is hard to establish the real 
cohesion and political power of these groups, for 
they seem to lack much common ground, put 
aside an ideological identity, for their activities. 
According to Betz (2012:706), “the means for 
them to exert noteworthy power – to compel, or 
attempt to compel, their enemies to do their will 
are available and growing in scale and 
sophistication. […] [Nonetheless] no networked 
social movements as of yet have attached existing, 
albeit new, ways and means to an end compelling 
enough to mass mobilize.” A clear example of 
that lack of critical mass and political cohesion is 
reflected in the generally known rivalry and 
competition between Anonymous and LulzSec 
(Fogarty, 2011), which became dramatic after a 
leader of the first (and probably founder of the 
second) was arrested by the FBI and turned in a 
lot of “Anons” in exchange for clemency and 
legal benefits (Roberts, 2012; Biddle, 2012). 
 
It is reasonable to argue that it is difficult to 
sustain the idea that such groups match state-like 
capabilities. It is also hard to establish the level of 
allegiance, competence, and cohesion (esprit de 
corps) among their ranks. Even so, there is scant 
if any evidence that actors other than states - for 
now at least - do have capabilities to harm and 
continuously cause havoc through digital means. 
As it will be shown below, treating the actions 
perpetrated by such groups as military operations, 
or even as terrorist activities in cyberspace might 
be dangerous for democracy without allowing 
clear improvement in security levels. 
 
Sure, even non-state actors could employ cyber 
attacks as part of a larger operation also involving 
direct political violence. However, such actions 
might be best captured by terms such as sabotage, 
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espionage, subversion, or even terrorism in a more 
extreme possibility (Rid, 2013). The notion that 
non-state actors can wage cyberwar properly 
defined resemble the once popular notion that 
non-state actors were capable of developing and 
using weapons of mass destruction in a sustained 
confrontation against states. One can imagine a 
scenario where a highly organized, rich, secretive 
and skilled non-state actor could acquire one such 
weapon and use it, but even that is not the same as 
waging chemical, biological, or nuclear war. In 
short, Clausewitzian criteria provide a better 
framework to assess cyber events and actors and 
decide if they are instantiations of war or 
something else. The Clausewitzean scientific 
research program is capable of incorporating and 
explaining such heuristic novelty represented by 





The controversies explored above not 
only encompass conceptual aspects of warfare, 
but also delve into some practical implications 
that are relevant for the overarching policy cycle 
in different countries. In sum, they highlight the 
political, economic, and societal trade-offs that are 
involved thereon. This article argues for a more 
precise and circumscribed concept of cyberwar 
that is better for addressing the phenomenon at 
various levels of concern and planning, related to 
both national and international security.  
 
As Collier and Mahon (1993:845) remind us, 
“stable concepts and a shared understanding of 
categories are routinely viewed as a foundation of 
any research community. Yet ambiguity, 
confusion, and disputes about categories are 
common in the social sciences”. The perpetual 
quest for generalization and the effort to achieve 
broader knowledge generate what Sartori (1970; 
1984) called conceptual traveling (the application 
of concepts to new cases), but also may cause 
conceptual stretching (the distortion that occurs 
when concepts do not fit the new cases). 
According to him, understanding the proper scope 
of validity of a concept (the set of entities in the 
world to which it refers) as well as its intention 
(the set of meanings or attributes that define the 
category and determine membership) is essential 
in order to avoid overstretching. While the use of 
cyberwar is a recurrent rhetorical trope in public 
debates, it demands more than heat and loudness 
to call for the attention it deserves. Democracy 
and security can only be preserved and nurtured 
by serious consideration of the consequences and 
proper scope of political concepts, along with 
their policy implications. 
 
Childress (2001:181), for example, provides an 
interesting view on the morality of using the 
language of warfare in social policy debates: “in 
debating social policy through the language of 
war, we often forget the moral reality of war. 
Among other lapses, we forget important moral 
limits in real war – both limited objectives and 
limited means”. Childress however is not 
suggesting that one should avoid metaphors at all. 
However, the loose use of the metaphor of 
cyberwar, for instance, might not only lead to the 
aforementioned conceptual stretching, but also to 
improper or ineffective responses. 
 
Consider for instance two widely adopted 
categorizations of cyber threats and cyber 
conflicts. The first one categorizes cyber terror, 
hacktivism, black hat hacking, cyber crime, cyber 
espionage, and information war on the bases of 
motivation, target, and method (Lachow, 
2009:439). The second one deals mainly with the 
purposes of hacktivism, cyber crime, cyber 
espionage, cyber sabotage, cyber terror, and cyber 
war (displayed from the lower to the higher level 
of potential damage, and from the higher to the 
lower level of potential probability) (Cavelty, 
2012:116). 
 
Both classifications are very abstract and treat the 
same events with different labels. For Lachow 
(2009:440) Estonia was just a case of hacktivism, 
while for Cavelty (2012:109) Estonia should be 
understood as one of the “main incidents dubbed 
as cyber war”. Why do those differences matter? 
Mainly because depending on the framing of a 
problem, the ensuing political responses will vary. 
The more securitized a social event is, the more 
exceptional and extreme can be the governmental 
responses to it (Buzan, Waever, et. al., 1998). 
 
Treating activism, criminal activities, terrorism, 
and acts of war interchangeably undermines the 
state capability to adequately respond to a specific 
threat or conflict. Equally important, by throwing 
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different categories of actors under the same 
umbrella, it poses real threats to the civil liberties 
and political rights of individuals all around the 
world, despite the type of political regime they 
live under. For as Betz (2012:694-695) reminds us, 
cyberspace 
 
“[…] Extended a number of command, 
control, communications and intelligence 
capabilities [to non-state actors] which 
only the richest states could afford two 
decades ago; but the best picture is rather 
different with the state use of cyberspace 
as a means of war. For one thing, as the 
Stuxnet virus, which targeted the Iranian 
nuclear program, demonstrates very well, 
such capabilities do not come cheap […] 
For the purposes at hand, however, the 
significant thing about Stuxnet (which in 
historical perspective may be seen as the 
Zeppelin bomber of its day – more 
important as a harbinger of what is to 
come than for its material contribution to 
the conflict at hand) is that it was not the 
work of hackers alone but of a deep-
pocketed team which had both excellent 
technical skills and high-grade 
intelligence on the Iranian program.” 
 
In sum, asking the right questions while assessing 
anything “cyber” is thus necessary to avoid either 
trivializing real wars that might come or 
undermining civil and political rights when 
treating all cyber conflicts as war. 
 
  


















Figure 1. Simplified Graphical Representation of Cyberspace 
 
The illustration does not intend to represent the different sizes and individual characteristics of each system. 
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 Article  
Argentina Space: Ready for Launch  
 
Daniel Blinder 
Desire for a comprehensive space program, one that includes an indigenous satellite launch capability, 
motivated Argentina to strengthen relevant policy institutions and carefully reconsider its approach in 
foreign affairs. In the process, this space power on the semi-periphery bridged bitter domestic partisan 
differences on the federal budget and allayed security fears of the international community, fulfilling at 
least some important national objectives regarding economic development as well as Argentinean access 
to space. 
 
 Argentina has pursued space technology 
development since the 1960's, and this 
development has always been linked to national 
political forces.
1
 In Arturo Frondizi's presidency 
(1958-1962) the National Commission on Space 
Research (CNIE) was created and immediately 
subordinated under military control. Since then, 
many remarkable goals were achieved: the rockets 
Alfa, Beta, and Gamma Centauro; subsequent 
projects Orion, Castor, Rigel, Tauro; and 
especially the Canopus II, which launched a 
monkey into space and brought it back alive.
2
  
However, there was no policy aimed at 
institutionalizing space programs that continued 
across political administrations, and often there 
was a fine line between civilian and military 
activities
3
: This could be explained because no 
                                                          
1
 Dr. Daniel Blinder is researcher at the Centre for 
Studies on History of Science and Technology, José 
Babini, National University of San Martín (UNSAM) 
and professor at the National Defense School 
(EDENA) in Argentina. 
2
 The CNIE achieved technological successes. 
However, due to traumatic political events in Argentina 
during the 1960s and 1970s, and the lack of an explicit 
direction or clear technological development project, 
CNIE never solidified as an institution. Other issues 
likely contributed to low institutionalization such as the 
international context of the Cold War and the influence 
of that bipolar conflict upon diffusion of technologies 
on the periphery. In my doctoral research I tracked 
institutional documents with scarce results: not many 
documents could be found about CNIE (as would be 
expected for a politically sensitive and highly 
personalized organization). 
3
 To read more about the ambiguous line between civil 
and military activities see: J. Johnson-Freese (2007), 
democratic consolidation existed until 1983, and 
space activities were not consolidated until the 
1990's, when a shift of political direction brought 
more intense and productive linkage between two 
processes: foreign and space policy.
4
 For 
methodological purposes, space policy is defined 
broadly in this paper to include all those explicit 
or non-explicit policies, planned or unplanned, 
systematically or non-systematically organized, 
which are aimed toward developing or having 
space capabilities.
5 
The point of view we take tests a somewhat 
controversial assumption that different theoretical 
approaches are needed to understand the 
international and political environment of 
peripheral states. What is the real connection 
between foreign policy and space policy in a 
middle-income country like Argentina, and our 
employment of specialized theoretical frameworks 
like Peripheral Realism or Dependency Theory? 
The scholar and former advisor to Argentina’s 
foreign minister Carlos Escudé introduced his 
theory of peripheral realism by trying to 
understand the world not from the viewpoint of 
the world powers, but from the countries of the 
                                                                                          
Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia 
University Press). 
4
 Satellites are another stage of technology policy in 
Argentina, related to the institutionalization of space 
policy and the creation of the National Commission on 
Space Activities (CONAE) under civilian control. 
Since the 1990's onwards, Argentina has successfully 
built satellites such as Lusat-1, Victor-1, SAC-A, SAC-
B, SAC-C, SAC-D, and SAOCOM. 
5
 Launcher, satellite, or both.  




 According to Escudé, the international 
system has an incipient hierarchical structure 
based on perceived differences between states: 
those that have power and give orders, those that 
do not have power and obey, and those that rebel.  
His approach introduced a different way to 
understand the international system: that is, from 
the unique viewpoint of states that do not impose 
the rules of the game in the international arena, 
and which suffer high costs when they confront 
them. Therefore, foreign policies of peripheral 
states are framed and implemented in such a way 
that national interest is defined in terms of 
development, confrontation with great powers is 
avoided, and autonomy is not understood as 
freedom of action but in terms of the costs of 
using that freedom. Escudé recognized that his 
theory is indebted to Dependency Theory, which 
is essentially a theory to explain lack of or 
perverse development. Notwithstanding, 
Peripheral Realism is also a “periphery and core” 
theory, and according to Escudé, many “realists” 
were actually peripheral realists because they read 
the international environment realistically and 
from the periphery: Big powers object, bully, or 
even destroy small powers when these have the 




The following sections of this article first analyze 
ruptures and continuities of domestic politics and 
foreign policy regarding missiles and space for 
Argentina during the Menem (1989-1999) and 
Kirchner/Fernández de Kirchner (2003-2012) 
presidencies. The article then discusses whether 
space policy on the periphery is primarily a matter 
of security or development, taking Argentina as a 
case study of space technology on the semi-
periphery. This paper traces the pathway toward 
strong institutions regarding space policy and 
examines the topic of Argentina as a reliable state: 
a country that conforms to legitimate codes of 
conduct in world affairs with regard to its space 
                                                          
6
 C. Escudé (1992), Realismo Periférico: Fundamentos 
para la Nueva Política Exterior Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Planeta). 
7
 C. Escudé (2012), Principios de Realismo Periférico: 
Una Teoría Argentina u Vigencia ante el Ascenso de 
China (Buenos Aires: Lumiere). 
activities.
8
 Finally, it argues that institutions 
matter when a state embarks on development of 
sensitive dual-use technology. There is a strong 
relationship between technology acquisition and 
international relations. Consequently, peripheral 
states in general, not just Argentina, are more 
likely to succeed in development and national 
security aims when they consciously integrate 
their technology policy with foreign policy.  
SECURITY OR DEVELOPMENT? 
The foremost institutions that played a 
role in the consolidation of space policy in 
Argentina were the Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
Comercio International y Culto (MRECIC), and 
CONAE (National Space Commission). The first 
one depended directly on the president; even so, 
the political direction was imprinted in MRECIC, 
and MRECIC is still one of the most professional 
bureaucracies of Argentina, along with the Armed 
Forces. CONAE is also a professionalized 
institution, and until 2012 it was under the 
MRECIC umbrella. The aim of this institutional 
hierarchy was to have a dual purpose for space 
policy. First, space was a venue for foreign policy 
and the pursuit of peace through carefully 
calibrated international objectives, nuclear 
nonproliferation policy, and cooperative 
Argentine foreign policy on sensitive issues such 
as technologies related to war. The second 
purpose of space institutions was to achieve 




Considering technology policy as part and parcel 
of foreign policy, both substantively and 
institutionally, we can draw lessons for managing 
                                                          
8
 My use of the term “reliable” or “reliability” stems 
from politicians, diplomats, and space policy actors’ 
regular use of this term in Spanish. The word refers to 
the reliability of behavior for a country, which follows 
(and is believed to follow) international norms. 
9
 On the one hand, space policy was a top-down 
process in which political leaders used                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
space as a foreign policy issue, and later as a 
development issue as well. But in CONAE it was not 
only Conrado Varotto leaving his mark as director.  
Diplomats, technicians, engineers, mathematicians, 
physicists, and astronomers became influential, also, in 
a bottom-up process.  
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tradeoffs between national security and 
development objectives. To begin, we try to 
understand the decision-making processes on 
research, development, and cancellation of the 
Condor II missile project in Argentina during the 
1990s. The Condor II project was initiated during 
the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), and the 
subsequent (Radical Party) civilian government of 
Raúl Alfonsín took the political decision to go 
ahead with it, disposing institutional and 
economic expenditures for this purpose. 
Nevertheless, Condor II was restricted in practice, 
and paralyzed later, due to hyperinflation and 
economic crisis. At the same time, European 
companies financed the project,
10
 linking it to 
Middle Eastern countries, namely Egypt and Iraq, 
and changing the focus from an economic 
development agenda to an international security 
agenda, given international sensitivity toward 
those countries suspected of weapons proliferation. 
The ending of the Condor II project and the 
emergence of the civilian National Commission 
on Space Activities (CONAE) were two 
connected events. Again, before the creation of 
CONAE, the national space institution was the 
National Commission on Space Research, under 
                                                          
10
 According to the 1985 Secret National Decree, 
which created the institutional frame for the “Satellite 
Plan,” the name given to the project Condor II, and 
further investigations that linked companies, the 
contract between the Air Force with Aerospace SA (a 
company composed by the Argentina Air Force and 
other small national companies) led to interactions with 
several European countries. Consen (Consulting 
Engineers) had by then headquarters in Switzerland 
and Monte Carlo, and was a subsidiary of the 
Messerschmitt Bölkow Blohm, Daimler Benz. IFAT 
Corporation had relations with the Ministry of Defense 
of Egypt, and Desintec was a West German company. 
Consen worked with Italian SNIA-BDP, a subsidiary 
of Fiat, and with the French SAGEM. See D. Blinder 
(2011), Tecnología Misilística y Sus Usos Duales: 
AproximacionesPolíticas entre la Ciencia y las 
Relaciones Internacionales en el Caso del V2 Alemán y 
el Cóndor II Argentino. Revista Iberoamericana de 
Ciencia Tecnología y Sociedad (CTS), 6 (18): 9-33; see 
also R. Diamint, “Cambios en la Política de Seguridad. 
Argentina en la Búsqueda de un Perfil no Conflictivo”. 
N°7, Vol. VII, Chile: Flacso. Both papers summarize 
links between European companies and the Middle 
East. 
the Air Force, and space policy was not 
sufficiently institutionalized. 
Condor II was a medium-range missile developed 
in Argentina under Air Force auspices. Its 
development started between the end of the 1970s 
and the beginning of 1980. For military aviation, 
it became a strategic project after Argentina had 
been defeated in the Falklands War (1982) and the 
Air Force had lost deterrent capability along with 
its aircraft and fighter pilots. Though Condor II 
received contributions from both European 
companies and countries such as Egypt and Iraq, 
its development was classified.  
Due to its secretive nature and the reputation of 
certain countries supporting its construction, the 
United States pressured Argentina to deactivate 
the project for the sake of limiting missile 
proliferation and stabilizing international 
security.
11
 At the same time Argentina was 
developing the Condor project, it was developing 
nuclear technology as well, which was in fact, a 
part of the strong tradition of this South American 
country. From the 1960's, in these two sensitive 
technologies Argentina had important advances, 
linked always to a nationalist ideology, 
developmentalism, and the regional security 
dilemma with Brazil.
12
 This explains why military 
institutions were involved. In Harding's words, “a 
technological and political maxim that 
materialized during the space age is that there has 
been an inexorable and symbiotic relationship 
between space programs, missile technology, and 




The foreign policy of President Carlos Menem 
(1989-1999) radically changed the traditional 
positions of the Argentine Republic in 
international relations. In the context of his 
presidency, the world was also mutating in a 
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 The United States was concerned about Condor II’s 
potential to serve as a Weapon of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) delivery system.  
12
 Emanuel Adler (1987), The Power of Ideology. The 
Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and 
Brazil (Berkley: University of California Press).  
13
 R. Harding (2013) Space Policy in Developing 
Countries: The Search for Security and Development 
on the Final Frontier (London: Routledge), p. 16. 
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radical way: the Soviet Union disappeared, and 
the tensions of the Cold War faded. The United 
States emerged as an international superpower, 
and in that context, Argentina had a long tradition 
of anti-Americanism in its foreign policy, a 
tradition that Menem proposed to change, opening 
up to free trade and generating "special"
14
 
relations with the major world power.
15
 However, 
the economic, political, and social crises that 
affected Argentina towards the end of the Menem 
administration (and that deepened in the following 
presidency of Fernando de la Rua) resulted 
eventually in a rupture of national leadership and 
a major change of direction on political and 
economic issues with President Kirchner in 2003. 
Kirchner’s administration proposed to restart and 
develop the industrial policy that had existed 
before Menem, recover the economy on the basis 
of import substitution, and project foreign policy 
especially toward South America. Although there 
was some confrontation with the United States, 
institutional frameworks of foreign policy made in 
the 1990s nevertheless continued, for example, the 
stable Argentine policy positions on international 
security and terrorism
16
. But under Menem’s 
administration, technological development was 
limited while under Kirchner’s, the country 
sought to develop its own technological 
capabilities, organic to the country's productive 
means. 
The foreign policy objectives of the 1989-1999 
period with respect to space policy were "special 
relations” with the United States and a successful 
quest for international reliability. Notwithstanding 
these efforts, results of ‘technology policy’ from 
the period, derived in conjunction with the free 
market economy, were deindustrialization of the 
country and technological denationalization. In 
                                                          
14
 C. Escudé (1992) Realismo Periférico: Fundamentos 
para la Nueva Política Exterior de Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Planeta). 
15
 F. Corigliano (2003), “La Dimensión Bilateral de las 
Relaciones entre Argentina y Estados Unidos durante 
la Década de 1990: El ingreso al Paradigma de las 
'Relaciones Especiales',” en Carlos Escudé (Ed.), 
Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la 
República Argentina, Parte IV, Tomo XV (Buenos 
Aires: GEL).  
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 C. Escudé (2012), Principles of Peripheral Realism 
(Buenos Aires: Lumiere). 
contrast, again, for the period 2003-2012, the 
foreign policy, in broad terms, resulted in good 
relations with the United States, cooperation in the 
major international forums in the field of security, 
and establishment of a South American 
orientation. Technology policy of the Kirchners 
was different in that it was activist and 
industrialist, promoting national scientific and 
technological development. 
The political role of technology called ‘sensitive’ 
in peripheral contexts is a key issue encompassing 





developing nations that seek to exploit space 
technology in general,
 
counting all satellite 
launchers as sensitive technology is problematic 
and contentious. On the other hand, having 
missile launch technology mastered by fast 
developing nations is also controversial because 
this has destabilizing effects and poses consequent 
dangers for world peace and international order. 
Especially for peripheral countries in the 
international system, security related to 
nonproliferation is incompatible with the right to 
development, that is, of non-central countries to 
develop new technologies for export-led growth. 





were salient cases for institutionalization of a 
technology policy, linking it directly with foreign 
policy. The Condor missile was a defense project 
begun during the military dictatorship in 
Argentina. The ultimate destruction of this missile 
and abandonment of the program was the reason 
for creating CONAE. The new Argentine space 
agency was institutionalized through bilateral 
relations with other space agencies as an 
insurance policy. This way, Argentina would only 
develop space technologies for peaceful purposes 
consistent with the standards of multilateral 
regimes such as the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), etc. 
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 Countries that have the capability to launch satellites 
are the United States, France, Japan, China, Great 
Britain, the European Space Agency, India, Israel, 
Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.  
18
 National Commission on Space Activities, again, the 
space agency of Argentina. 
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What drove Argentina toward a dramatic 
institutional change in order to pursue similar 
space launch technologies? Recall that Condor II 
affected military interests because it (a) could be a 
military threat to future targets of the Argentine 
state (the Falklands/Malvinas War was close in 
time); and (b) could be sold to other nation-states, 
which would use it for military purposes. Yet, 
Condor II also affected commercial interests due 
to the fact that (a) the missile system included 
dual-use technology, and, as the military 
technology was also part of international trade, 
missile technology suppliers feared market 
competition; and in addition (b) the missile 
technology could be used for space exploration 
and to orbit satellites for commercial reasons. 
 
ARGENTINA AS A CASE STUDY OF 
SPACE TECHNOLOGY ON THE SEMI-
PERIPHERY 
Studying the case of space policy in 
Argentina allows us to make some informed 
conjectures on the role of peripheral states in the 
development of sensitive technology projects. 
Specifically, space technology on the periphery 
brings out the relationship between domestic 
policy and technology policy in developing 
countries, and some tensions between the 
sovereign right to development and security limits 
imposed by the international order. Does every 
country have the right to develop dual-use 
technologies that only a select club of space 
powers currently possesses?
19
 In the case of 
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 See R. Harding (2013), Space Policy in Developing 
Countries: The search for Security and Development 
on the Final Frontier (London: Routledge). About 
dual-use technologies this book says that “Besides the 
bipolar nature of the East–West conflict during the 
Cold War, one of the traditional constraints on the 
space programs in developing countries has been 
restrictions placed on the export of space-related 
technology. Before 1992, all US satellite-related 
technologies were classified as “munitions” and 
therefore subject to regulation by the US State 
Department under a regime known as the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). During the mid-
1990s, these restrictions were eased for “dual-use” 
technologies, which are those not exclusively military 
in purpose and application. The line between the two 
concepts in practice, however, is nebulous, since 
essentially all space technology is dual-use.”  
Argentina, a semi-peripheral state, there are direct 
and indirect pressures from central states of the 
international system, threats of sanctions or other 
impediments, aiming to prevent access to 




Despite major changes in political orientation, 
there was institutional continuity between 1989 
and 2012. Cancellation of the Condor project, 
signing and ratification of nonproliferation treaties, 
confidence-building measures toward the United 
States, and neoliberal
21
 economic policies 
implemented in the first period (1989-1999) had a 
decisive impact on the second period (2003-2012). 
However, the success of the second period 
corresponds with economic policies 
(Keynesianism or state intervention; 
industrialization; and foreign policy focusing on 
regional integration, especially Latin America) in 
opposition to those of the first. The institutional 
consolidation of CONAE and intervention of the 
Foreign Ministry, cooperating in all these matters 
with the United States (enduring agreements with 
NASA, ratification of nonproliferation treaties), 
marked the course of development of space 
technology for the next decade. Numerous 
ongoing satellite missions, today, and the 
development of a satellite launcher, the Tronador 
II,
22
 are products of successful institutions, as 
opposed to specific political parties or private 
sector corporations, guiding technological 
development.  
Journey toward Strong Institutions  
Condor II and the military dictatorship, 
1976-1983: The reasons for the Argentine military 
to protect Condor II contemplated geopolitical 
and economic considerations and a vision for the 
country to become a technological powerhouse, to 
increase its military power after defeat in the 
Malvinas War. With this goal in mind, the 
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 By semi-periphery, we mean a country on the 
periphery of the international system but which has 
some kind of industrial and technological development, 
21
 Free market economy, market deregulation, no State 
intervention, and privatization. 
22
 Having a national launcher is considered by the 
space authorities in Argentina as a goal for autonomous 
technological development in space. 
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military, without any public oversight,
23
 did not 
behave as a responsible social group in terms of 
technology management. But the context is 
relevant, here: The Condor project was the fruit of 
a military dictatorship in which the Air Force was 
a political player of the first order. As such, and 
bereft of any control, they did what they wanted to 
do. In the follow-on civilian administration of 
President Alfonsín, the military were no longer 
the political power, but the power of the military 
lobby was still strong. In that sense, during the 
period of the return to democracy, the government 
of Alfonsin could not be characterized as free 
from pressures of the "military party" and, for that 
reason, Condor remained unaccountable to the 
Argentine public. 
Condor II and the Alfonsín Government, 1983-
1989: During the administration of Raul Alfonsín, 
Condor II took on greater dimensions, expanding 
its financing through capital from Middle Eastern 
countries—Egypt and Iraq—as well as funds from 
domestic and European companies, through a 
secret presidential law.
24
 Even so, the project was 
halted due to the lack of a budget: There was 
always difficulty assessing the true financial costs 
of Condor II and political irresponsibility when it 
came to promoting missile development 
incompatible with the economic and financial 
circumstances of the country. Argentina was 
undergoing major economic and monetary crises 
caused by high, uncontrolled inflation. There were 
informal pressures during this period. Defense 
officials received through several channels 
messages from the American government linked 
to the missile project and concern over its 
eventual use. During the subsequent Menem 
government, Argentina did enter the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a decision 
arising from international pressure as well as 
Menem’s pro-American instincts.  
Condor II and the Menem Government, 1989-
1999: During the Menem government, the Condor 
missile came to light, taking on status as a public 
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 The govermment was a dictatorship; no checks and 
balances existed as in a pluralistic democracy in which 
the budget and infrastructure projects are public 
domain and under control of democratic institutions. 
24
 A Secret and Executive Order under the law of 
Argentina of 1985, quoted above.  
issue. In addition, the international context 
transformed. The Soviet Union imploded, and the 
United States was emerging as the single 
superpower. In Menem’s presidential term, 
international pressure for cancellation and 
destruction of Condor could no longer be denied 
in political discourse. The missile became an 
irritant in bilateral relations with the United States.  
With Argentina’s new foreign policy of alignment 
and the urgent need of international credit for 
managing the country’s external debt, Menem 
decided to terminate it. The creation of CONAE 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the plan 
adopted by the Menem government, aiming to 
institutionalize pillars of foreign affairs and space 
issues.
25
 Due to this same impulse, the 
government signed international security treaties 
such as the MTCR. Agreements were also signed 
with NASA, and joint satellites were developed 
and launched. But an indigenous launcher was not 
considered, given the bilateral conflicts that had 
emerged over Condor II. Instead of investing 
enormous quantities of money to make a launcher 
that would arouse international suspicion, launch 
services were hired when needed. 
Success or Failure?  
Was Argentina's foreign policy between 
1989 and 2012 regarding space policy a success? 
Destroying the Condor missile and creating 
CONAE was a long-term policy. Could it be 
assessed as positive? Broadly speaking, the 
government of Menem de-industrialized the 
economy, binding decisions of technology policy 
to "market forces." Neoliberalism and special 
relations with the United States were two facets of 
this policy agenda. By the same token, special 
relations with the United States led Argentina to 
higher status in terms of international trust and 
access to technologies that before were denied due 
to an erratic policy on space. The Menem 
administration complemented strategic 
agreements with NASA with policies that aimed 
to build a good relationship with the American 
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 F. Corigliano (2003), “La Dimensión Bilateral de las 
Relaciones entre Argentina y Estados Unidos durante 
la Década de 1990: El Ingreso al Paradigma de las 
'Relaciones Especiales',” en Carlos Escudé (Ed.), 
Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la 
República Argentina, Parte IV, Tomo XV (Buenos 
Aires: GEL).  
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government as a whole. Argentine-U.S. space 
cooperation included the launching of μSAT-1, the 
experimental satellite Victor in 1996, the SAC-B 
in 1996 to study the sun, the Nahuel-1A in 1997, 
the SAC-A in 1998 with experimental objectives, 
and the SAC-C in 2000 for earth observation. All 
these satellites were launched by rockets from 
other countries, of course. They were meant to 
send a clear signal to the United States that 
Argentina would not develop its own ballistic 
missile. Nevertheless, due to solid space 
institutions under CONAE, Argentina advanced 
its national space capacities and achieved 
international recognition. 
Since the creation of CONAE, institutional 
foreign policy has borne fruit: If we compare 
technological achievements from before and after 
creation of the agency, CONAE is clearly 
associated with new space capacities. Had 
Argentina remained burdened with the Condor 
missile project,
26
 it is unlikely the country could 
have pulled off this performance. Technological 
outcomes were also tied to industrial policy 
started in 2003 by the Kirchner administration. 
The need for a public policy on industrial and 
technological development tied to a responsible 
foreign policy is indicated. All these policies were 
important elements of a grand strategy built 
around national development. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITIES 
MATTERED MORE THAN POLITICAL 
RUPTURES 
Discontinuities in the 2003-2012 period: 
A new non-confrontational foreign policy toward 
the United States, active participation in the 
MTCR (and other agreements such as non-
proliferation treaties), cooperation with NASA 
and other agencies, and of course, the process of 
institutionalization of the space sector focused on 
CONAE, against these endeavors, we can 
question, what were key discontinuities in the 
2003-2012 period? First, the country changed 
from a non-industrial economic model in the 
1990s, to a model of industrialization in the 
Kirchner presidency. In terms of technology 
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 The Condor project lacked an institutional frame, on-
budget investment, and a compatible, supportive 
foreign policy. 
development, there was a greater emphasis on 
multilateral foreign policy, especially toward 
South America, the ongoing development of a 
domestic launcher (Tronador), and a sequence of 
Argentine satellites placed into orbit. For 
Argentina, development of a rocket engine or a 
communications satellite was no longer wedded to 
a nonnegotiable national security strategy of 
nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, national 
prestige and compensation for wounded pride of 
the military defeat in the Malvinas War were only 
feasible through civilian-run programs at CONAE, 
and left-of-center governments in the post-Menem 
era wisely appreciated both enduring political 
objectives.  
International Reliability 
The issue of Argentina’s climb to 
respectability as a powerful partner in Latin 
America also relates to the shift from a secret 
space program under the military dictatorship to 
open institutionalization under CONAE. Prior to 
that change, Argentina had confrontational 
discourses and policies, and was reluctant to 
follow U.S. international leadership. The 
American diplomatic response included a 
storyline that continued over many years, 
consisting of diplomatic efforts (formal and 
informal) to paint the South American country as 
a state that promoted proliferation, a U.S. 
narrative that gained credence from Argentina’s 
historical attempts, under military leadership, to 
develop space and nuclear technologies. 
The way it was imagined internationally, 
Argentina was not reliable during the dictatorship 
because it was a military government that seized 
power, menacing neighbors and killing its own 
people without trying them in a legal court. After 
that, even with the democratic government of 
Alfonsín, Argentina was not reliable because it 
was a weak and incipient democracy—army 
attacks against the government in order to return 
to military rule had already taken place. Then, in 
the days before the inauguration of Menem, 
Argentina was not reliable because it was going to 
be ruled by a nationalist and xenophobic 
government, rooted in Peronist doctrine. Such a 
doctrine had frequently been associated with 
confrontational behavior towards the United 
States. In the end, even with the Menem 
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government showing clear signs of alignment with 
the West on foreign policy, it was required by the 
H.W. Bush administration that the Condor II 
missile be destroyed. This was accomplished 
under Menem, though much later, during 
Kirchner’s administration, alarms still dogged the 
claim that Argentina yearned for an indigenous 
satellite launcher.
27 
When Argentina’s past unreliability was 
mentioned within the international community, 
what was being transmitted was a representation 
built by U.S. diplomacy, the mass media, and the 
universities.
28
 The categorization of reliability was 
divorced from actual threats to the national 
security of the United States, to international 
peace, and to non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.  Rather, the epithet was married 
to political economy, to political and economic 
gambits, the main objective of which was 
economic and military supremacy of the 
hegemonic power. The pursuit and continuance of 
hegemony along key dimensions of international 
power still involves control of sensitive 
technologies, which really do pose danger to U.S. 
dominance if they spread around the world.   
This leads us to think about arguments couched in 
security terms that mask commercial interests. 
Such arguments are not necessarily conspiratorial. 
Whether the space technology in question is 
domestic or foreign, a country that wants to have 
some place among nations, “a place in the sun,” 
and that wants to improve its citizens’ standard of 
living would use state of the art technologies: 
Rockets and satellites are among them. Without 
using space technology, a country, in general, 
loses in the field of economic development. Using 
alien and so-called reliable technology, though, 
often marks a path to dependency. From an 
analytical point of view, it is impossible to 
separate concepts of safety and business. How far 
does commercial interest extend until political 
interest or security reasons, not related to 
commercial ones, compel a central power to 
impose technological bans or restrictions on 
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 La Nación, 24/04/2011. “EEUU Terminó un Plan 
para Revivir el Misil Cóndor.”  
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 D. Hurtado de Mendoza (2010), La Ciencia 
Argentina. Un Proyecto Inconcluso. 1930-2000 
(Buenos Aires: Edhasa). 
peripheral countries? A sensitive technology has 
always both sides of the coin, and a peripheral 
country who does not write the rules of the game 
is in a disadvantaged position in comparison with 
a central state who does write such rules.   
A quick glance shows that countries with reliable 
space technology are the United States (major 
world power), Russia (former Soviet Union and 
previous world power), France (and through it the 
European Space Agency), Japan, China, India, 
Israel, Ukraine, and South Korea. Countries with 
unreliable space technology are Iran and North 
Korea. Again, what makes some reliable and not 
others? Which category will describe countries 
such as Argentina or Brazil that develop in the 
next decade satellite launchers? Without 
predicting precisely what will happen in 
technology development, acceptance of Argentina 
as a space power will depend upon written and 
unwritten international rules as well as the 
interests of the U.S. hegemon. Should the current 
trend toward multipolarity deepen, wise and 
moderate diplomacy from Argentina and other 
semi-peripheral states could raise the chances of 
these countries achieving reputation and de facto 
legitimation as reliable space powers, with all the 
attendant commercial and security benefits.
29
  
Years after the consolidation of space policy at 
CONAE, Argentina developed the GRADICOM
30 
missile project, which raised concerns
 
on external 
and internal levels, including diplomatic officials 
and CONAE members, who wanted to be 
explicitly separated from any activity qualified as 
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 Written and unwritten rules include the claims upon 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the United Nations 
and in other international forums, the repudiation of a 
war, as such, that drove the military coup, and criticism 
aimed at nuclearization of the South Atlantic by the 
United Kingdom (the British are supposed to have 
nuclear weapons in the Falklands, going against all 
peace treaties of the regional states). Agreements and 
treaties attach direct consequences to the status of 
being a "reliable country" internationally. No such 
treaty surpasses in importance the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
for the Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
30
 Gradicom missile development involves a solid-fuel 
rocket developed by the Argentine Ministry of Defense 
for weapons purposes.  




 Despite international pressures, formal 
and informal, mimicking those that buffeted 
Argentina in the nineties with respect to the 
Condor project, GRADICOM may survive in the 
new international environment. States contending 
for power on the international scene such as China 
and Russia now open a horizon of possibilities for 
Argentina. The strategic alliance with Brazil and 
MERCOSUR's importance in foreign policy, 
along with UNASUR and CELAC,
32 
indicate a 
substantial change in the international arena, 
which reduces priority of relations with the 
leading powers and lends momentum to the 
integration and development of other nations. This 
shift in permissible initiatives, including 
GRADICOM, presents a window of opportunity 
in Argentina’s case to develop the space sector 
without crashing directly into the United States or 
oncoming countries seeking to revise American 
hegemony
33
.     
The creation of the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Productive Innovation at the end 
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 Gradicom stirred debates within political and 
business circles linked to Argentine space policy 
regarding proliferation. Argentina already has a liquid-
fueled rocket for peaceful purposes, the Tronador. 
Gradicom opened discussion about how a solid-fueled 
companion would affect civil space, which depends 
heavily on international cooperation, Argentina’s 
standing in the policy arena of non-proliferation, and 
foreign affairs, especially those related to conventions 
in the field of space development. 
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 MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and 
recently Venezuela. It is an alliance of free trade and 
the axis of integration between Argentina and Brazil 
since the 1990s. UNASUR (South American Union of 
Nations) is an Alliance of countries in the territory of 
South America, whose diplomatic objective is to 
achieve regional integration. CELAC (Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States) is a diplomatic 
alliance with objectives of integrating nearly all 
countries of the Western Hemisphere. Successor to the 
Rio Group, it is an institutional alternative to the 
Organization of American States, which includes the 
United States.  
33
 Further evidence of informal pressure on Argentina 
was the broadcast concern of CONAE Administrator 
Conrado Varotto to be reliable to the United States and 
show that space development in Argentina was 
peaceful at all aspects. 
of 2007 changed expectations and linked 
commercial and security policies even more 
closely. The system of science and technology 
must now provide knowledge to increase value-
added exports. National industrial recovery 
requires closure of the technological gap and 
invites the State, once again, to take an active role 
in development. 
Investment and Technological Development  
With the creation and consolidation of 
CONAE in the 1990s, progress was made in 
institutional issues, as well as in some access to 
sensitive technology. Difficult budget decisions 
notwithstanding, since 2004 annual funding 
increased as befitting CONAE’s strategic status, 
this despite the new industrial direction of the 
country under the Kirchners. A glance at Law 
24,061 of 1991, which contained the national 
budget with the newly created CONAE, reveals 
the amount was 1,587,124,000 pesos for Culture 






from this baseline, the specific budget, in pesos, 
for CONAE in 2001 was 15,007,037 (Budget 
2001), and in consecutive years was 13,896,000 
(Budget 2002), 17,023,066
36
 (Budget 2003), 
13,663,051 (Budget 2004), 39,922,336 (Budget 
2005), 73,370,035 (Budget 2006), 120,368,547 
(Budget 2007), 203,909,252 (Budget 2008), 
293,317,858 (Budget 2009), 260,913,712 (Budget 
2010), 346,321,636 (Budget 2011), and 
565,174,968 (Budget 2012).
37
 The CONAE 
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 From 1991 to 2002, established by the 
“Convertibilidad” Law, 1 peso was equivalent to 1 U.S 
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 Until 2001, the budget is hard to find published or 
online. To take an example, the budget of 1991 was not 
only obscure with respect to space technology; it did 
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impossible to classify where the money went according 
to law.  
36
 From 2003 on, each U.S. dollar was 3 pesos. From 
2010 to 2012, each U.S. dollar was 4 pesos.  
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 Presupuesto del Sector Público Nacional de la 
República Argentina, año 1991. Presupuesto 
Consolidado del Sector Público Nacional 2001 de la 
República Argentina. Aprobado por la Decisión 
Administrativa N°53 del 2 de Mayo de 2001. 
Presupuesto Consolidado del Sector Público Nacional 
2002 de la República Argentina. Aprobado por la 
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numbers tell a clear tale; they show the growth of 
the budget during the presidencies of Kirchner 
and Fernández de Kirchner, exhibiting strong 
interest in space activity despite their skepticism 
toward free-market policies. The Kirchners built 
upon the institutional base of the former Menem 
period (the 1990s) and supported economic and 
political sacrifices as technology investments, in 
terms of budget implementation in space.  
To fully appreciate the determination behind this 
national effort to become a space power, it serves 
to recall major changes in the international 
environment coinciding with the domestic 
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transition from Menem to the Kirchners. First, 
prior to the assumption of Nestor Kirchner, the 
attacks of September 11 abruptly shifted 
American policy, which became consumed by war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and often neglected South 
America. Second, the free-market economic 
policies of Argentina by 2002 led to yet another 
economic crisis and default. In the context of the 
new international environment based on 
regionalism and integration of South America, 
Argentina found its strongest allies, not within the 
traditional scope of Europeans, Americans, and 
Asians, but among its geographical neighbors, 
progressing at long last along the historical 
ambition of Latin Americanism in foreign policy. 
The Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner 
administrations inherited from the Menem 
presidency, on the one hand, an economic crisis 
tied to liberal economic measures, but, on the 
other, a legacy of liberal-oriented international 
commitments such as MTCR, the Tlatelolco 
Treaty, and the CONAE space agency with 
prestigious international ties.
38
 Without resources, 
of course, without a plan for technological 
development, it is not possible to produce a 
sensitive technology of strategic importance. But 
to develop such a technology, a state must also 
account for strategic behavior of powers in the 
international system: From 2003 Argentina, under 
a statist administration that could easily have 
undercut the national venture in space technology, 
instead increased significantly the public capital 
put toward science and technology, and undertook 
the strategic diplomacy necessary to protect the 
space sector. The result is observable progress on 
the satellite launcher, Tronador II, centerpiece of a 
longstanding national dream to possess an 
Argentine launcher and blossom on the 




                                                          
38
 Liberal as an economic concept means free-market 
oriented policies and deregulation. Liberal as an 
International Relations Theory relates to one of the 
most important schools of thought, focusing on 
international institutions and cooperation. 
39
 The VEX-1A and VEX-1B were test rockets for 
Tronador II development. Both tests were made in 
2014. The first could not fly, but the second was a 
successful launch. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
In countries with weak processes of 
development and, therefore, without the economic 
capacity, governments struggle to gain 
international legitimacy for the use of sensitive 
technologies. To be a reliable space power, for 
example, Argentina must not only establish a 
technically credible satellite vector, it must also 
demonstrate political and economic capacities to 
legitimize possession and use of these 
technologies. If satellite technologies can be 
considered indispensable in the path toward 21
st
 
century economic development, then political 
unreliability in the fields of proliferation and 




Developing countries such as Argentina should 
articulate technology policy and foreign policy in 
such a way that they are really one integrated 
program for development and diplomacy. For 
example, if Argentina were to successfully 
develop a domestic satellite launcher in the 
coming years, it would come about five decades 
since world powers were able to produce the first 
launchers, enough time for this technology to 
mature.
41
 Half a century ago, the race for a 
satellite launcher meant for Argentina a race to be 
part of the first group of countries in the 1960s 
with access to space. In the 2010s, however, 
launcher technology is becoming less provocative 
for powers that, years before, developed it. For 
semi-peripheral states, of course, the technology 
remains a factor of economic dynamism, and thus 
a strategic achievement in terms of regional 
leadership and national prestige.
42
 
                                                          
40
 Sensitive technologies are a red line in the 
overlapping fields of technological capabilities, 
international politics, and ethics. Hegemonic powers, in 
order to preserve the status quo, commonly relegate 
non-core countries to the technological margins, far 
away from sensitive capabilities and, not incidentally, 
to economic dependence on lead powers that created 
and control the contemporary order.  
41
 Vernon Ruttan (2006), Is War Necessary for 
Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
42
 The question of mature technologies is an important 
issue: "As a field of commercial technology that 
The unwritten law of the free market requires each 
independent actor to balance costs and benefits. 
Consequently, if for Argentina it was more 
profitable to deliver its own satellites using a 
foreign launcher, this would make investments in 
local research and development less attractive. 
Under this free market view, when it was cheaper 
not to develop the technology, the domestic 
launcher became unnecessary for the country. 
Other budget priorities like food, infrastructure, or 
police filled the vacuum. 
Saying that the Condor missile/launcher project, 
“was no longer necessary for the country" was an 
affirmation, which at its root denied the value of 
technology policy. Unfortunately, as we have 
implied, technology development (even more 
since the Washington Consensus of the 1990s) is 
central to any semi-peripheral state with the 
requisite human capital: for international prestige; 
regional and global leadership; deterrent 
capability; expanding markets and new 
businesses; and creating spillover that accelerates 
economic development.
43
 As the second in 
command at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
during the Menem administration explained, 
"Do you think Argentina can spend five thousand 
million dollars to put a vector in the air? 
Brazilians could not. They were not able and they 
have a budget ten times higher than our own. 
From fifteen years now they have wanted to put a 
satellite with a national launcher […] and they 
couldn't. It is very difficult and very expensive 
technology. Then, what did the Menem 
administration do? We could not produce vectors 
because we were not reliable; the world was going 
to believe that we were manufacturing costumed 
missiles. […]. Then, if you want to put a satellite 
in the sky, you have to go elsewhere, and do what 
is called the taxi service, hiring the services of 
countries such as the United States, Europe, China, 
and Russia. You could hire their services, and you 
would be putting the satellite in the sky! […] It is 
                                                                                          
initially drew heavily on military R&D or military and 
defense-related procurement matures, its dependence 
on military and defense-related sources tends to decline. 
The flow of knowledge and  technology may then 
reverse— from spin-off to spin-on" (Ruttan, 2006).  
43
 Ruttan, (2006).  
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much cheaper to travel by taxi than to buy a car. 
The most expensive part is not the launch, but the 
research to achieve it".
44
   
Space technology policy in the presidency of 
Carlos Menem was not focused on research and 
strategic development but on the laws of the free 
market and the institutionalization required to gain 
reliability. The space policy was an excellent 
institutional policy and a wise foreign policy. But 
it definitely was not technology policy. The 
Minister’s taxi metaphor spoke to the fact that—in 
the short term—it is considerably less expensive 
to hire the launcher than to develop a domestic 
one. Paying for a car, or pursuing a rocket 
launcher, results in the domestic capabilities to 
reach national space goals, but a state must invest 
a large amount up front: It is necessary to perform 
the research. Taking a taxi, or renting a launch 
service, also allows a country to reach space goals, 
probably faster, but a developing country renting a 
ride will always be dependent on someone else’s 
car.
45
 The choice to have a technology or not, for 
a country on the semi-periphery, is just as 
strategic as it would be for an economic and 
military powerhouse like Russia or the United 
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 Cisneros, Andrés (Vice Canciller). Buenos Aires, 
May 18, 2010. Interviewed by Daniel Blinder. Quoted 
from “Globalization, Geopolitics and Sensitive 
Technologies in Peripheral Situation: Missile/Space 
Technology in Argentina (1989-2012).” [Globalización, 
Geopolítica, y Tecnologías Sensibles en Situación 
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45
 This was Varotto's idea, and he explained it, off the 
record. He went through a litany of reasons why 
Argentina would not be able to continue relying on the 
United States or others to get its satellites into space: 
the high launch costs of acceptable providers and the 
GOA's unwillingness to run afoul of International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by dealing with 
lower-cost providers of launch services such as China 
or India. Developing its own SLV (satellite launch 
vehicle) capability was the least costly alternative for 
Argentina’s space program with such constraints (no 
documentation/citation available). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper does not endorse building a 
launcher without analyzing the economic cost of 
such an effort. On the contrary, having a launcher 
gives not only greater political autonomy for 
activities in space but also opens opportunities for 
economic development: Countries that once 
struggled to build launchers now offer launching 
services in the marketplace. The question is why 
when some countries develop technologies they 
are innovative while others are rogues that 
proliferate. The answer is a construction of 
scholars, media, and diplomacy. While empirical 
evidence about Argentinean proliferation does not 
exist, the facts instead show how journalists, 
politicians, and scholars speculate on the potential 
and possibilities of such nefarious enterprise. 
These ideational constructions matter. Regardless 
of how compliant Argentina is empirically, an 
international belief that the government is a 
scofflaw hurts Argentina’s national interest: 
Following Escudé, small powers cannot throw 
themselves against large powers—even in popular 
misconception—without paying a real world price.  
The ongoing story of Tronador II has highlighted 
dynamics between international politics and the 
development of dual-use technologies in semi-
peripheral contexts. There is, in fact, a strong 
relationship between international policy and 
technological development, no less so on the 
semi-periphery, where developing countries with 
great promise face limits or outright bans on 
technologies already produced and in some cases 
commercialized by world powers. In addition, 
powerful states that created the current world 
order also set the rules of that order. In 
consequence, written and unwritten laws of the 
international system determine which countries 
register as developing a benign space rocket and 
which others end up ostracized for proliferating 
ballistic missiles. Despite the serious potential for 
hostile reactions, semi-peripheral countries that 
want to grow economically will need to act firmly 
in their development aims, even as they pay 
respect to rules of world powers. Under this 
tension between development goals and 
cooperation with the international community, 
technology policy with the proper institutional 
basis, accommodating to domestic political 
 Blinder / Argentina Space 46 
 
constraints of a vibrant democracy, can still 
flourish.  
What are the political and economic benefits of 
space and other state-of-the-art technologies in the 
context of semi-peripheral countries? State-of-the 
art technology gives semi-peripheral countries 
recognition and extra chips for international 
negotiation with rule-making world powers. On 
the economic front, such technology stimulates 
research and development, technology transfer, 
and spillover into other areas of international 
commerce. The story of Tronador II demonstrates 
that a semi-peripheral country like Argentina can 
thread the needle in order to reap both diplomatic 
and developmental benefits from state-of-the-art 
technology. 
The missile/space policy of the Menem 
government (1989-1999) was to cancel the 
military’s Condor project and bind Argentina 
through international agreement to 
nonproliferation as a means of improving relations 
with the United States. These radical course 
corrections coincided with institutionalization of 
space policy, creating CONAE under civilian 
control with civilian purposes only.  
CONAE’s careful correspondence with 
Argentina’s broader foreign policy objectives was 
a key accomplishment of Menem's administration. 
CONAE’s purpose was to pave the road to space 
for Argentina, in part by facilitating international 
agreements with foreign space agencies and 
international treaties. Interestingly, CONAE 
helped Argentina build its reputation for 
international reliability during this initial phase 
without significant investments in launcher 
technology or groundbreaking satellite projects. 
Nevertheless, institutionalization through CONAE 
and a foreign policy of international engagement 
set the basis for future events of Argentine 
technological development.  
Institutionalization at both domestic and 
international levels had important consequences 
during the subsequent Kirchner and Fernández de 
Kirchner administrations. The institutional frame 
of CONAE and the main accords of the prior 
administration under international agencies like 
the UN and the MTCR continued, actually thrived, 
as state spending on technology, including space 
technology, mounted without setting off 
international alarm bells. With an active policy on 
re-industrialization and development of science 
and technology, Argentina achieved its objectives 
of having satellites in space, and several 
milestones toward the manufacture of Condor’s 
descendant, Tronador II.  
Today, Argentina, against long odds at the 
cancellation of Condor, is fast becoming a space 
power, with the capacity to produce satellites and 
launchers, in cooperation with other countries and 
while enhancing its reputation for international 
reliability. Indeed, wise technology policy is more 
likely to emerge on the semi-periphery in general 
when public institutions shape it in conformance 
with enduring goals of both strategic diplomacy 
and national development. 
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 The past several decades have 
revolutionized the way we communicate and how 
modern states wage war.
1
 Today it is nearly 
impossible for most people around the world to go 
more than a few minutes without their lives being 
directly impacted by technology and information 
systems. From the moment a person wakes up to a 
digital alarm clock, turns on the news and coffee, 
and takes a shower, every aspect of their lives 
relies on technology in some way. The growth of 
the Internet of Things in the coming years will 
only increase the impact of technology on all 
aspects of daily life. The information technology 
revolution has not only influenced the lives of 
consumers and corporate America but has 
revolutionized the way wars are fought. The era of 
the general on the battlefield or the admiral at sea 
disconnected from higher leadership is gone. 
 
Today a general is more likely to direct the war 
effort from an operations center surrounded by 
hundreds if not thousands of digital information 
streams, from satellite imagery, UAV footage, and 
information about every troop’s digital location, 
down to real-time audio and video from individual 
soldiers on the battlefield. While this revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) and the strategic 
advantages it gives modern militaries is still 
fiercely debated, there is little doubt that it has a 
profound impact on the lethality of modern armed 
forces and their ability to conduct operations 
around the globe. 
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graduate of the Columbia University School of 
International and Public Affairs. The views expressed 
here are his own. 
While the technological revolution has shaped 
modern life and war fighting, it has also created 
new vulnerabilities that did not exist in earlier 
conflicts. Although there is still a diverse 
academic debate about the potential impact and 
scope of cyber warfare, there is general agreement 
that a successful attack on information technology 
systems would have a profound effect on modern 
social, economic, and military capabilities. In 
2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta echoed 
the warning of several national security scholars 
when he suggested that a digital “Pearl Harbor” 





It is difficult to quantify and evaluate the potential 
consequences large-scale cyber attacks could have 
on a modern state, but there is a growing 
consensus that such attacks would have a 
profound impact on daily life and severely limit 
modern war fighting capability. Academics, 
policy makers, and strategists agree that future 
wars will not be limited to conventional or nuclear 
forces but differ in their analyses of the effect 
cyber threats will have on information technology 
systems, as well as the appropriate tactical and 
strategic responses to mitigate such threats. 
Regardless of who is right, states must begin to 
adopt policies and strategies for dealing with 
cyber threats and even deterring aggression in 
cyberspace. One of the pressing questions in cyber 
strategy is how to effectively implement a 
deterrence strategy in the cyber domain. This 
paper will explore the practicality of cyber 
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 Leon E. Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta on 
Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National 
Security, New York City, Department of Defense Press 
Release, October 11, 2012. 
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deterrence and will focus on applying traditional 
deterrence concepts to the cyber domain.  
  
The concept of cyber deterrence is based on the 
idea that a state or non-state actor can deter a 
cyber-attack through conventional or non-
conventional means, whether through defensive 
measures, the threat of cyber counterattack, or the 
potential threat and use of conventional or even 
nuclear forces. Cyber deterrence is mostly based 
on prior theories of nuclear and conventional 
deterrence but faces unique challenges due to the 
unconventional nature of the cyber domain. The 
main challenges with cyber deterrence and the 
academic arguments posed focus on whether or 
not cyber deterrence should center on retaliation 
or prevention; the problems that exist with 
attribution; the debate about rational or 
proportional response; and the implications of 
conflict escalation from cyberspace to 
conventional conflict domains. Each of these 
issues presents unique challenges for dealing with 
cyber deterrence and implementing a capable, 




 In order to understand the applications of 
deterrence in the cyber domain, it is important to 
first understand the main concepts behind 
deterrence theory. These concepts, although most 
successfully applied to the use of nuclear weapons, 
have been debated for centuries and can be 
applicable to all war fighting domains and types. 
Clausewitz characterized all warfare as “politics 
by other means,”
3
 and Sun-Tzu claimed “the 
supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without 
fighting.”
4
 While these classical war theorists 
wrote long before the advent of modern 
information technology systems or nuclear 
weapons, their ideas directly apply to deterrence 
theory.  
 
The essence of deterrence is to raise the cost of 
fighting in order to “subdue the enemy without 
                                                          
3
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
4
 Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, Roger Ames, trans. 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1993). 
fighting.” Thomas Schelling’s seminal work on 
deterrence theory, Arms and Influence, 
summarized the core elements of deterrence by 
claiming that the power to hurt is bargaining 
power. These two elements – the power to hurt, 
and the power to bargain – can be applied to any 
conflict and are the basis of any successful 
deterrence strategy.
5
 Without either element, 
deterrence strategies cannot succeed.   
  
The key strategies, requirements, and challenges 
were summarized and applied to cyberspace by 
Kenneth Geers in his 2010 article in Computer 
Law and Security Review. Geers argues that there 
are two ways to approach deterrence: one is denial, 
or the ability to prevent a potential adversary from 
obtaining capabilities, a more defensive strategy; 
the other is punishment, or the ability to make the 
consequences of a certain action so costly that the 
adversary will not undertake the action. Geers 
further describes Schelling’s three requirements of 
any successful deterrence strategy – capability, 
communication, and credibility – and applies 
them to denial and punishment strategies.
6
 
Capability is the actor’s ability to prevent or 
punish an adversary; communication is accurately 
conveying that capability to the adversary; and 





Martin Libicki described the aims and methods of 
deterrence and discussed their application to the 
cyber domain in his RAND study, 
Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. He claims “the 
aim of deterrence is to create disincentives for 
starting or carrying out further hostile action. The 
target threatens to punish bad behavior but 
implicitly promises to withhold punishment if 
there are no bad acts or at least none that meet 
some threshold.”
8
 According to Libicki, effective 
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 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2009), 
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punishment is a key part of an effective deterrence 
strategy.  
 
James Lewis further expanded on the 
requirements of deterrence strategy, noting “the 
concept of deterrence rests on a series of 
assumptions about how potential opponents 
recognize, interpret and react to threats of 
retaliation. The fundamental assumption is that a 
correct interpretation by opponents will lead them 





For state actors these assumptions typically hold 
true. If it is assumed that a state is a rational actor, 
then for a deterrence strategy where one state 
communicates its capability to deny or punish an 
adversary in a credible manner, the adversary state 
will respond and bargain (so long as the threat is 
clearly communicated and credible). While this 
assumption holds true for state actors, it is 
difficult to apply to sub-state and non-state actors, 
as such actors typically focus on cyber crime and 
cyber terrorism, not state-versus-state cyber 
warfare. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
analyze the practicality of cyber deterrence on a 
state level. The paper will make no attempt to 
apply cyber deterrence to sub-state and non-state 
actors. 
 
United States Air Force Major General Susan 
Helms, in her review of a large-scale deterrence 
exercise conducted by the Air Force, summarized 
some of the underlying problems with deterrence 
in any domain. She stated that deterrence must be 
planned and conducted before any hostilities 
occur or appear imminent, and that, “an effective 
deterrence strategy is not one that is defined by 
actions within one domain, or one area of 
responsibility, or one nation.”
10
 She also 
reinforced Geers and Lewis’s assertions that 
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deterrence “must not be invisible”
11
 or that it must 
be communicated to the adversary that is being 
deterred.
12
 General Helms also commented on the 
need for deterrence strategists to understand the 
adversary’s perspective and that effective 
deterrence strategies are continually evolving. 
 
To be effective at the strategic 
level, deterrence must be viewed 
through the lens of how your 
adversary views the geopolitical 
world.  Deterrence is not static; 
effective deterrence strategies will 
morph under conditions of crisis, 
and the level of uncertainty about 
your adversary’s decision process 
must be actively tracked and 
accounted for, or else you risk 





Only by incorporating these elements can an 
effective deterrence strategy be formulated and 
successfully implemented in any domain. 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
 Although there are fundamental 
differences between nuclear, cyber, and other 
forms of deterrence, it is important to understand 
the context and application of nuclear deterrence 
in order to apply it to other domains. Nuclear 
deterrence represents the most widely researched 
and arguably the most successful implementation 
of deterrence theory in history and therefore 
demands careful analysis before attempting to 
establish a new deterrence strategy in cyberspace. 
Mike McConnell, the former director of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) in a 2010 Washington 
Post article summarized some of the key elements 
of Cold War deterrence and attempted to relate 
                                                          
11
 General Helms’s claim holds true for most historical 
examples but fails to explain Israel’s nuclear weapons 
program and uncommunicated deterrence strategy. The 
Israeli program may provide a useful case study for 
future applications of cyber deterrence, where states 
are unable to communicate a credible threat without 
compromising their capability. 
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them to cyber warfare. “During the Cold War, 
deterrence was based on a few key elements: 
attribution (understanding who attacked us), 
location (knowing where a strike came from), 
response (being able to respond, even if attacked 
first) and transparency (the enemy’s knowledge of 
our capability and intent to counter with massive 
force).”
14
 These same elements summarize the 
main requirements and weaknesses with cyber 
deterrence. Attribution and location are essential 
to any deterrence strategy, as are response 
capability, and transparency, but each of these 
elements present unique problems when applied to 
the cyber domain.   
 
While there are many similarities between nuclear 
deterrence and cyber deterrence, there are several 
important differences that present unique 
challenges in the cyber domain. First, nuclear 
deterrence during the Cold War was not as simple 
as many outside observers believe in today’s post-
Cold War world. There was a fierce debate 
between academia and policy makers, particularly 
during the 1950s and 1960s, about how to best 
implement a nuclear strategy. These discussions 
went through several evolutions of counter force 
versus counter value doctrine and eventually led 
to an American policy of assured destruction, 





Second, nuclear deterrence typically relies on the 
use of nuclear weapons to deter another state from 
using nuclear weapons.
16
 While such a strategy 
was unpleasant and difficult to contemplate, it did 
not require an escalation in conflict. Once nuclear 
war began, it would theoretically be easier for a 
decision maker to respond in kind with nuclear 
retaliation. This assumption may not hold true in 
cyberspace. In order for states to retaliate against 
a cyber-aggressor they may need to resort to 
conventional attacks in order to maintain 
proportionality and limit the attacks’ effect, or if 
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15
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the initial aggressing state has little cyber 
infrastructure to hold at risk.  
 
As the Department of Defense concluded in a 
working study on the ‘Essential Elements of a 
Deterrence Strategy for Cyberspace,’ “the best 
response to an attack through cyberspace in many 
cases will not involve a reciprocal attack back 
through cyberspace.”
17
 This assumption makes it 
difficult to apply conventional understanding of 
nuclear deterrence to cyberspace because it is hard 
to predict how decision makers will actually 
behave in critical moments of cyber warfare. 
 
The third critical difference between nuclear 
deterrence and cyber deterrence is reflected in the 
fact that while nuclear deterrence strategy 
eventually led to the adoption of nuclear arms 
control measures and limitation treaties, it is 
unlikely that a similar international agreement on 
cyber disarmament will be reached. Nuclear 
deterrence only holds because most current 
nuclear powers declare their nuclear weapons 
capabilities and are assumed to behave rationally. 
Furthermore, the United States and Russia have 
signed several treaties limiting the development 
and deployment of nuclear weapons in order to 
maintain peace and stability in the hope of 
avoiding war. These treaties form the basis for 
various confidence building measures between 
states that help limit the likelihood of 
miscommunication and inadvertent escalations. 
 
This problem led the Department of Defense to 
conclude that cyber attacks are “an unrealistic 
candidate for traditional arms control” because “it 
is difficult to prove or disprove that an adversary 
has a cyber-attack capability, making any sort of 




Finally, cyber weapons are based on dual-use 
technology. While there are some technological 
similarities between nuclear weapons programs 
and peaceful civilian nuclear programs, there are 
also clear distinctions between the two that are 
easily discernable to weapons inspectors and other 
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experts. Furthermore, there are a limited number 
of states that possess the resources necessary to 
independently develop nuclear weapons, and the 
countries that have these resources would be 
unable to quickly convert civilian programs into 
weapons programs without attracting international 
attention. Even the most advanced non-nuclear 
states would require months (if not years) to 
successfully convert from one program to the 
other, therefore making it much easier for current 
nuclear powers to monitor the limited number of 
nuclear-capable states and then react if such a 
conversion were to be initiated. 
 
These issues lead to the conclusion that the 
attempt to draw extensive similarities between 
nuclear and cyber deterrence is not a reliable or 
correct approach to implementing a successful 
cyber deterrence strategy. It may be necessary to 
apply lessons learned from other types of weapons 
to questions concerning cyber deterrence and 
cyber weapons in order to gain a more complete 
understanding of the potential approaches and 
challenges of implementing a cyber-deterrence 
strategy. 
 
APPLYING DETERRENCE THEORY TO 
THE CYBER DOMAIN 
Although most academic research on 
deterrence deals with nuclear deterrence, there is a 
growing field of research on the practicality of 
applying nuclear deterrence strategy to the cyber 
domain. These writings present conflicting views 
on the practicality of the synergy between the two 
modes of war fighting but both share common 
background. General Helms stated that one of the 
most important conclusions drawn from a set of 
deterrence exercises conducted at Schriever Air 
Force Base was that “some lessons about 
deterrence from the Cold War era do not 
necessarily translate to the space and cyber 
realm.”
19
 Even if Cold War lessons of deterrence 
do not directly apply in the cyber domain they 
provide a useful framework for reference in 
addressing the problem of cyber deterrence and 
attempting to establish a functioning cyber 
deterrence strategy. 
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One of the key issues with cyber deterrence is 
establishing what types of threats should be 
deterred and how to deter them. The simplest 
division of cyber threats places them into three 
categories: nation-state threats, terrorist threats, 
and criminal threats. Terrorist and criminal cyber 
threats, while dangerous and costly, do not pose as 
serious of a national security threat to the United 
States as nation-state threats, and existing counter 
terrorism and law enforcement mechanisms are 
more appropriate to face the threat than the 
Department of Defense. Furthermore, 
responsibility for dealing with terrorist and 
criminal cyber threats has been primarily 
delegated to the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Department of Justice rather than 
the Department of Defense. As such, the 
Department of Defense and United States Cyber 
Command’s (USCYBERCOM) focus centers 
around threats posed by nation-states. Therefore, 
the primary focus of a cyber-deterrence strategy is 
the Department of Defense’s efforts to deter 
nation-state threats in cyberspace. 
 
As nation-state threats are the focus of deterrence 
strategy, they need to be analyzed in more detail. 
State-based threats can be further divided into 
cyber espionage and cyber attacks. Cyber 
espionage threats are primarily focused on 
collecting information through cyberspace while 
cyber attacks are designed to damage information 
and systems and potentially cause physical 
harm.
20
 In theory, cyber espionage threats should 
be handled similarly to traditional espionage 
threats through robust defensive and counter 
intelligence programs. Despite the theoretical 
virtues of such a division it is difficult to 
implement in practice due to the difficulty in 
distinguishing between cyber espionage and 
attack threats. Oftentimes, the capability for 
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implementing a cyber attack is the same as for a 
cyber-espionage threat, and the only difference is 
the intent of the actor. Furthermore, there is the 
potential that a cyber-espionage threat could be 
misinterpreted as preparation for a cyber attack 
and could elicit a military response. 
 
In order to apply Cold War lessons about 
deterrence to the cyber realm, there are several 
steps that the United States must take. Former 
NSA Director and Director of National 
Intelligence Mike McConnell argues that in order 
for cyber deterrence to work, America must 
express its intent to use deterrence, it must 
translate intent into capabilities, and the ability to 
“signal” an opponent about potentially risky 
behavior must be developed.
21
 Although 
McConnell argues that the technology exists, 
there are many potential challenges with cyber 
deterrence that must be addressed to make it a 
viable defensive strategy. 
 
Prevention or Retaliation 
 The two main schools of thought on how 
to use deterrence in any domain advocate 
retaliation (punishment) or prevention (denial). 
Former Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn 
said that, “we cannot rely on the threat of 
retaliation alone to deter attacks; deterrence must 
be based on denying the benefits of the attack.”
 22
 
Kenneth Geers applied this to cyberspace by 
stating “this means improving defenses, so that 
launching an effective attack becomes more 
difficult and expensive, and improving resiliency, 




Although Secretary Lynn advocated the use of 
denial in deterring cyber-attacks, most scholars 
agree that prevention is not sufficient in the cyber 
domain and that a more aggressive retaliation 
approach to cyber deterrence must be pursued. 
Geers argues: 
 
Denial is unlikely due to the ease 
with which cyber attack 
technology can be acquired, the 




 Geers, 6. 
23
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immaturity of inter-national legal 
frameworks, the absence of an 
inspection regime, and the 
perception that cyber attacks are 
not dangerous enough to merit 
deterrence in the first place.  
Punishment is the only real option, 
but this deterrence strategy lacks 
credibility due to the daunting 





Defense in cyberspace is further complicated by 
the decentralized nature of the Internet and the 
vast amount of data transmitted. According to a 
2011 Cisco report, in 2010 there were 1.84 
devices connected to the web per person in the 
world, and by 2020 Cisco predicts that number 
will reach 6.58 devices per person.
25
 Cisco also 
estimates that by 2015 just less than one zettabyte 





The mass connectivity of devices, the large 
amount of data transmitted on a daily basis, and 
the decentralized nature of packet-based 
communication systems make it nearly impossible 
to implement a defensive strategy that is one 
hundred percent effective, and the cost of securing 
network systems to prevent all attacks would be 
unstainable. However, the difficulty of 
implementing a defensive or denial strategy for 
cyber deterrence does not mean that states should 
ignore defense.  
 
Defense can be useful in limiting cyber terrorism 
and cyber crime but is not likely to prevent a well-
funded nation-state or state-sponsored actors from 
compromising digital systems. States should 
continue to invest in cyber security and defensive 
systems but must recognize that, barring a 
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significant technological breakthrough, well-
funded nation-state actors will be able to penetrate 
secure information systems, necessitating a 
punishment response. 
 
Although the United States and many other 
nations have the capabilities to punish potential 
cyber aggressors, there are several other 
challenges to pursuing this type of strategy. Geers 
goes on to state: 
 
The trouble with a punishment 
strategy, however, is that 
governments are always reluctant 
to authorize the use of military 
force (for good reason). 
Deterrence by punishment is a 
simple strategy but one that 
demands a high burden of proof: 
a serious crime must have been 
committed, and the culprit 
positively identified. The 
challenge of cyber attack 
attribution, described above, 
means that decision-makers will 
likely not have enough 
information on an adversary’s 
cyber capabilities, intentions, and 





Furthermore, “Deterrence by punishment is a 
strategy of last resort.”
28
 States are typically 
reluctant to use any kind of military force unless 
there is a clear cause to do so. In addition, 
deterrence by punishment in the cyber domain 
faces the problem of identifying the attacker. 
Without the capability to attribute an attack, 
deterrence by punishment strategy becomes 
ineffective. 
  
A punishment strategy is also difficult to 
implement based on political and moral concerns. 
Without clear attribution of an attacker, 
punishment could be perceived as an overreaction 
or could be misdirected at an innocent third party. 
The consideration of the use of non-cyber forces 
to respond to a cyber attack would further 
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compound these concerns. The United States will 
require a high burden of proof before responding 
to a cyber attack with conventional force, and 
decision makers will struggle with the question of 
using conventional force to respond to a cyber 
attack. These questions could limit the credibility 
of a punishment strategy that is one of the 




Michele Markoff, a senior policy adviser 
in the State Department’s Office of the 
Coordinator for Cyber Issues, succinctly 
summarized the importance of attribution in 
deterrence strategy when she said, “classic 
deterrence policy fails in the absence of 
attribution.” She went on to state, “attribution, the 
ability to determine who is attacking you, is 




Although the Department of Defense is working 
to
 
improve its ability to attribute attacks, its 
attribution system is still not perfect and the 
Defense Department is assuming that following a 
large scale attack it will be forced to operate in a 
degraded environment, which will further hinder 




Cyber attribution is also hindered by attribution 
challenges that are unique to the cyber domain. 
While it is easy to identify a conventional or 
nuclear attacker, identifying a cyber attacker is 
much more difficult. James Lewis stated that, 
“since we know the identity of an attacker in 
perhaps only a third of cyber incidents, and since 
a skilled attacker will disguise their identity to 
appear as someone else, the United States could 
easily attack the wrong target.”
31
 These 
uncertainties make it difficult to make a credible 
threat necessary for deterrence outside of 




General Helms summarized these problems. 
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We are all aware of the 
challenges of attribution, and yet 
the measure of your deterrence 
campaign’s success or failure 
depends on it. Without 
confidence of attribution, how do 
you credibly assure an adversary 
in a pre-crisis environment that 
you intend to respond? How do 
you mitigate the risk of a third 
party exploiting the ambiguity to 
create or escalate the crisis? How 
can you assess the success of 
meeting your deterrence 
objectives and adjust your 
adversary-focused campaign 





The questions General Helms posed accurately 
reflect the main problems with cyber deterrence 
and provide an excellent roadmap for what the 
United States needs to do to implement a 
successful deterrence strategy. 
 
It may be possible that a cyber attack will be 
accompanied by kinetic action or other events in 
the international system that will help with 
attribution of a cyber attack.
34
 For instance the 
2007 cyber attacks on Estonia coincided with a 
diplomatic dispute between Russia and Estonia, 
suggesting that the attacks originated in Russia, 
although it remains difficult to determine if the 
attacks were state-sponsored or perpetrated by 
groups sympathetic to Russia that were not 
sponsored by the Russia government. A similar 
situation occurred in 2008 during the Russia-
Georgia War. During this conflict the attacks on 
Georgia’s internet infrastructure were most likely 
coordinated by Russia’s Foreign Military 
Intelligence agency (GRU) and Federal Security 
Service (FSB), but the evidence is still not 
concrete and may not have been definitive enough 
to justify a counterattack on Russian targets were 




 Department of Defense, “Essential Elements for a 
Deterrence Strategy for Cyberspace,” 8. 





Overreliance on external events could also 
provide its own set of difficulties as other actors 
could seek to exploit a difficult international 
situation or further confuse the situation by 
launching additional attacks.
36
 Third party actors 
could exploit a tense international situation 
through cyber attacks or conduct attacks that, as a 
result of false attribution, could escalate the 
conflict.  
 
Some of these dilemmas could be mitigated 
through robust intelligence collection efforts. If 
the United States is unable to attribute an attack 
through cyber forensics, it may be able to attribute 
the attack through intelligence sources. It is 
important to bear in mind, though, that reliance on 
such systems would require real-time coordination 
between the intelligence community and military 
authorities, which is not always seamless.  
 
The current construct and close relationship 
between USCYBERCOM and NSA likely makes 
such coordination practical but may become more 
difficult as NSA comes under increased scrutiny 
following recent leaks and when USCYBERCOM 
and NSA become more independent from each 
other in the near future. The commander of 
USCYBERCOM and the Director of NSA most 
likely will become separate positions following 





Capability, Communication, and Credibility of 
Cyber Deterrence 
 The final difficulty with cyber deterrence 
is the question of rationality and proportionality of 
response. James Lewis argues that in order for the 
United States to make a credible threat of 
retaliation, it needs to expand its options into 
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some other domain, but he also recognizes that 
such a response will escalate the conflict and 
present a new set of problems.
38
 Matthew 
Crosston agrees that cyber-attacks can be easily 
viewed as an act of war and that attribution is 
essential because cyber-attacks can quickly lead to 
physical consequences.
39
 A January 2013 report 
conducted by the Defense Science Board for the 
Department of Defense entitled “Resilient 
Military Systems and the Advance Cyber Threat” 
recognizes the potential for the escalation of cyber 
engagement in the future and recommends that the 
Department of Defense develop the capability to 
retaliate against a cyber attack with all elements of 
national power, suggesting that the United States 
needs to prepare to escalate a conflict beyond the 





The most conventional logic is to respond to a 
cyber attack with a cyber counterattack of some 
kind. Assuming the attribution problems are 
overcome, a state can counterattack in cyberspace 
similarly to how it would counterattack in any 
other domain. The difficulty with a cyber 
counterattack arises with Schelling’s three 
requirements of a successful deterrence strategy: 
capability to retaliate, communication of intent to 
retaliate, and the credibility of the threat.
41
 Each 
of these elements presents a unique challenge in 
cyberspace, and they are not mutually exclusive. 
 
The first retaliation difficulty in launching a cyber 
counterattack is maintaining the capability to 
respond. Cyber attacks are possible based on 
weaknesses in the system being attacked that 
allow the attacker to penetrate it. The 
                                                          
38
 Lewis, 3. 
39
 Matthew D. Crosston, “World Gone Cyber MAD: 
How ‘Mutually Assured Debilitation’ Is the Best Hope 
for Cyber Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, 
no. 1 (Spring 2010): 106, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/spring11.pdf 
(accessed February 7, 2012). 
40
 Department of Defense: Defense Science Board, 
“Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the 
Advanced Cyber Threat,” Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Washington, DC, January 2013. 
41
 Schelling. 
vulnerabilities to exploit are continuously 
changing as states patch security flaws and 
improve their defensive capability. Therefore, in 
order to maintain the ability to launch a cyber 
counterattack, the United States must continually 
search for weaknesses and develop exploits it can 
use against potential aggressors.  
 
It may also be difficult to respond to a cyber 
attack if the attacker is not as reliant on cyber 
technology as the Untied States. A state’s cyber 
vulnerability increases as the country becomes 
more reliant on information technology systems. 
If a state is not reliant on information technology, 
it may not be as vulnerable to a cyber 
counterattack as the United States is to a first-
strike attack. These problems could be 
compounded following a cyber attack, which 
could limit the ability of the United States to 
respond to a cyber first strike. To overcome this 
difficulty, the United States must develop reliable 
second-strike cyber capabilities that will function 
following a catastrophic cyber first strike. 
 
These three difficulties lead to the conclusion that 
the United States may need to respond to a cyber 
attack with a counterattack using other 
instruments of national power. A cyber attack may 
warrant a response with the conventional means 
of military power. Although there is some 
agreement that a kinetic retaliation to a cyber 
attack can be warranted, there are still concerns 
about the justness of such an action and the 
potential for quickly elevating the severity of the 
conflict. James Lewis claimed: 
 
Cyberspace poses a particular 
challenge for deterrence. State 
actors are engaged in harmful acts 
in cyberspace against the United 
States. However, military force is 
of limited utility in responding to 
or deterring actual cyber threats. 
A U.S. military response to 
espionage or crime would be a 
strange departure from 
international norms regarding the 
use of force. A retaliatory cyber 
attack (where the intention is to 
damage or to destroy, rather than 
exploit) or retaliation using a 
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kinetic weapon for a cyber attack 
against countries that have not 
used force against us or against 
individuals with criminal rather 
than political aims, could easily 
be interpreted as an aggressive 
and unwarranted act by the 
international community. The 
result is to cast doubt on the 
credibility of a retaliatory threat, 




By this logic, regardless of justness of a 
retaliatory strike, the perception that the United 
States would not escalate a cyber-conflict into a 
kinetic fight limits the credibility of such a threat. 
Geers goes so far as to argue that a kinetic 
retaliatory attack may be more proportional than a 
cyber attack: 
 
One important decision facing 
decision-makers in the aftermath 
of a cyber attack would be 
whether to retaliate in kind or to 
employ more conventional 
weapons. It may seem logical to 
keep the conflict within 
cyberspace, but a cyber-only 
response does not guarantee 
proportionality, and a cyber 





Nevertheless, this assertion fails to address the 
political willingness of the United States to 
escalate the conflict and assumes that other states 
would believe America’s threats.  
  
Martin Libicki describes the escalation of conflict 
and defines what he refers to as the level of 
belligerence in conflict from least to most 
belligerent with respect to the use of diplomatic 
and economic force, cyber force, physical force, 
and nuclear force.
44
 The United States and other 
nations are typically reluctant to elevate the level 
of belligerence from that of an attack suffered. 
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This reflects the lack of credibility that the United 
States has when threatening to use nuclear 
weapons. Although most states believe that the 
United States will respond to a nuclear attack with 
nuclear action, they do not expect that the United 
States will respond to a conventional attack with 
nuclear weapons except for in certain limited 
circumstances. This is one of the important 
distinctions between cyber and nuclear deterrence. 
While a threat of nuclear retaliation for a nuclear 
attack is credible, the threat of nuclear retaliation 
for a kinetic attack or of kinetic retaliation for a 
cyber-attack may not be. In order for cross-
domain deterrence to be used effectively, this 





The second difficulty of implementing a cyber 
deterrence strategy is the ability to credibly 
communicate the threat of retaliation. Geers 
claims that in order for a denial or punishment 
deterrence strategy to work in cyberspace, it needs 
to be clearly communicated to the potential 
aggressors.
46
 The difficulty with communication 
of a cyber retaliatory strategy is that clear 
communication of the capability to retaliate can 
compromise the exploit potentially used to 
retaliate. Therefore, communication of capability 
to respond to an attack can compromise the 
capability to respond.  
 
Developing a strong cyber counterattack force and 
demonstrating its ability to respond in several 
engagements, thereby clearly communicating to 
other potential aggressors that the state has the 
ability to respond to cyber threats without 
compromising specifics on how the state intends 
to respond, could overcome this problem. This 
difficulty can also be overcome by 
communicating the intention to respond to cyber 
attacks with conventional forces, which are easier 




                                                          
45
 Crosston, 113. 
46
 Geers, 298. 
57 Space & Defense  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Cyber deterrence presents unique 
challenges and questions for traditional Cold War 
deterrence models. These issues require careful 
consideration by policy makers and strategists, as 
well as increased investment in cyber capabilities 
in order to respond to a variety of cyber threats. 
Cyber deterrence, like nuclear deterrence, requires 
multiple responses and actions depending on the 
situation and how the United States plans to 
respond. The best option is for the United States 
to develop multiple capabilities, cyber and non-
cyber, in order to maintain its ability to respond 
regardless of the threat it faces. This approach is 
similar to Herman Kahn’s concept of escalation 
dominance in nuclear war, which he defined as 
 
[The] capacity, other things being 
equal, to enable the side 
possessing it to enjoy marked 
advantages in a given region of 
the escalation ladder…It depends 
on the net effect of the competing 
capabilities on the rung being 
occupied, the estimate by each 
side of what would happen if the 
confrontation moves to these 
other rungs, and the means each 





The United States needs to develop and maintain 
the capability to be dominant at all levels of 
conflict escalation in order to deter potential 
aggressors. The United States currently possesses 
these capabilities at higher levels of conflict 
escalation but needs to develop and maintain its 
dominance in cyber warfare as well. 
  
The United States has already invested significant 
resources into offensive and defensive cyber 
capabilities, and while the exact nature of these 
forces is not public knowledge, it is generally 
assumed that the United States maintains robust 
cyber forces that are as capable if not more 
capable than any other force in the world. This 
investment could explain why large-scale 
cyberwar, although predicted by pundits for 
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several years, has yet to materialize. The United 
States may already be perceived to possess strong 
enough cyber and conventional forces to maintain 
escalation dominance, which deters potential 
aggressors in cyberspace. If this is the case, the 
United States needs to continue to invest in these 
capabilities in order to maintain escalation 
dominance and prevent other states from 
developing asymmetric advantages that could be 
used against the United States. 
 
These assumptions are all based on attempts to 
apply nuclear deterrence theory to cyberspace, 
which although feasible in theory may differ in 
practice. A more applicable similarity may be the 
relationship between chemical or biological 
weapons programs and cyber weapons. All three 
are dual-use technologies that are simple to 
develop from civilian technology, easy to conceal, 
and can be adapted to a diverse set of targets. The 
Department of Defense also suggests there are 
similar difficulties in use between biological and 
cyber warfare: both “have the potential challenge 
of gaining access to specific targets, yet both can 
be applied indiscriminately across a wide range of 
targets. Similarities between biological warfare 
and cyber attack also can include uncertainty 
about attack attribution, uncertain effectiveness, 
the persistence of damaging results, and 
unintended consequences.”
48
 These similarities 
present a new framework for potential analysis of 
cyber deterrence and may lead to different 
conclusions. 
 
Overall, cyber deterrence presents many unique 
challenges, but applying traditional deterrence 
concepts to cyberspace can help to overcome the 
difficulties in implementing a successful 
deterrence strategy. The most difficult questions 
and debates do not center on the practicality of 
cyber deterrence but on the assertion that the 
threat of cyberwar may be overblown and that 
deterrence may not be necessary in cyberspace.  
 
If cyberwar proves to be less likely than 
anticipated, the United States may need to 
increase its investment in lower-level cyber crime 
and cyber espionage threats and decrease its 
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emphasis on cyberwar. If this is the case, 
traditional modes of warfighting will prove more 
significant than cyber concepts. If cyberwar, 
however, proves to be the way of the future, cyber 
deterrence will prove indispensable in order to 
“subdue the enemy without fighting.”
49
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Terror on High: Deterring ASAT  
 
Stephen Shea, Mathew Johnson, and Alfredo Zurita 
Layered deterrence and carrot-and-stick diplomacy are the main ingredients for deterring ASAT. 
 
As technology becomes even more 
pervasive in daily life, valuable and relatively 
vulnerable space assets will inspire greater desire 
to attack U.S. power through space.
1
  As a result, 
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) deterrence, a fledgling area 
of study, will need to be developed and addressed 
in detail. The proceeding essay will attempt to 
answer the following questions. What motivates 
space attacks? How will the enemy try to attack 
our space assets? What can be done to deter future 
ASAT attacks? 
 
REASONS TO ATTACK SPACE ASSETS 
Despite the precedent of peace in space, 
there is still the worry that these assets will be 
attacked. These fears are justified for several key 
reasons, including the limited orbital slots 
available for satellites and common designs 
among adversaries to blind the United States, 
challenge American hegemony in space, and 
fashion an asymmetric response to U.S. military 
actions. While no nation has of yet struck another 
nation’s space assets, the capability to do so has 
been repeatedly demonstrated. 
 
As the need for global telecommunications 
continues to rise, the space available in 
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) becomes smaller 
and more valuable. As of February 2014, there 
were 391 satellites active in GEO.
2
 The current 
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issue with this orbital region is that, while the 
satellites are not in significant danger of hitting 
each other, there is a required level of separation 
between assets to ensure there is no interference 
or overlap in telemetric frequency. Mission and 
environmental requirements cause GEO satellite 
contracts to cost well into the billions of dollars; 
each of these represents a significant investment 
for corporations as well as the host nation. 
Moreover, countries near the same longitude will 
desire the same sliver of the GEO ring and will 
have to voice their arguments to the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU).
3
 Losing this 
competition over a scarce resource could lead to 
ASAT attacks from certain leaders. If done a 





Historically, one of the driving factors in the 
research of space technology is the military 
benefits. One of these benefits is the capability to 
observe an enemy nation without an air-breathing 
platform, that is, without the risk of a pilot’s life 
or materiel. Knowledge of troop and equipment 
movements, for example, is invaluable during 
war; therefore, a nation has strong incentive to 
disable an enemy/rival nation’s space capabilities 
through ASAT methods. The incentives only 
increase for utility satellites such as those of the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) that aid weapon 
targeting and ship movements. 
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With the U.S. having launched approximately 
40% of the satellites currently active today, it 
holds the global lead for investment in space 
assets.
5
 Some space experts and U.S. political 
advisers have reasoned for the U.S. domination of 
space. In short, they have argued to make space a 
U.S. controlled resource and to selectively choose 
who can and cannot gain access.
6
 Such a 
statement is clearly unsettling to other national 
space agencies. These agencies are already 
occupied with internal politics and funding. 
Having outer space policed would cause great 
distress and international strife. The level of 
discomfort could result in other nations pushing 
back against the hegemon of the space domain 
and attempting to destroy U.S. military or 
commercial assets. Indeed, if the U.S., or any 
other nation for that matter, were to decide it 
would be the arbiter of what is allowed in orbit, 
one of the first logical steps would be to clear any 
opposition assets from the newly claimed area. 
  
An additional reason nations may attack space 
assets would be in retaliation for military actions. 
These actions may or may not have been space-
related to begin with—they could involve ‘cross-
domain’ coercion--but an aggrieved nation might 
see fit to retaliate against the attacker nation’s 
space assets. These nations may resort to ASAT 
operations, at a minimum to blind partially the 
attacking nation and thus curb the effectiveness of 
the original attack. In any case, before long, both 
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nations involved may be utilizing ASAT 
capabilities and, as such, they will be interested in 
counter-ASAT capabilities to protect what 




TYPES OF ASAT TECHNOLOGY 
Before international actors can become a 
threat, they need more than just the desire to 
destroy U.S. space assets. They need the 
capability. However, this is easier than it appears, 
for there are a multitude of ASAT methods, which 
can be condensed into five types: 
signal/intelligence disruption, terrestrial attack, 
kinetic annihilation, rendezvous disabling, and 
electromagnetic pulse. 
 
The most accessible type of ASAT capability is 
signal/intelligence disruption. The easiest method 
of countering space assets is jamming, for it can 
be done with simple equipment for a low cost. 
This is useful to disadvantaged actors but has 
much lesser effect than other types of attack. 
Another ASAT method of this category is using 
lasers to blind optical sensors, often used by non-
space powers. The last method is ‘spoofing’, or 
sending false commands. What distinguishes 
spoofing from a cyber-attack is that sending false 
commands does not involve unauthorized network 




All of these methods are typically temporary; 
outside the space-time window of effect, the 
satellite is at full functionality. They also are 
traceable, due in part to their lack of 
destructiveness, but direct retaliation is not an 
option. The international community does not 
consider military strikes in space to be a 
proportional response. Countries like Iran already 
take part in these ASAT methods without 
receiving U.S. retaliation, so there already are 
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 For now, 
signal/intelligence disruption must be countered 
technologically, not kinetically or politically, 
through cross-domain deterrence. 
 
Terrestrial methods for ASAT are those that 
attack the ground element of space operations, 
which includes ground infrastructure attacks and 
cyber-attacks. This type, while it does pose a 
significant threat, is covered under other realms of 
international law and requires different responses. 
Military strikes against ground stations count as 
attacks against sovereign soil of the targeted 
nation, which clearly justify military retaliation of 
the attacked country. Cyber-attacks involve a 
different operational domain than space and have 
different legal restrictions and military 
requirements than the space domain. Less formal 
differences between the domains include how 
easy it is for the aggressor to stay anonymous and 
who is capable of such an attack. 
  
Multiple space powers have developed highly 
destructive ASAT weapons using kinetic 
annihilation, which include attack satellites and 
ground, aircraft, or ship–based antisatellite 
missiles. While the launch platforms of 
antisatellite missiles are quite different, the use 
and technology required are very similar. The 
missile is launched on a sub-orbital, intercept 
course and collides with a target satellite, 
completely destroying it. Both the United States 
and China have demonstrated this capability. The 
other developed system is an attack satellite, the 
Istrebitel Sputnikov. This Soviet satellite was 
designed to be rapidly launched from storage, 
approach a target satellite, and launch projectiles 
at the target satellites.
10
 It is unclear whether 
Russia still holds this capacity. For both of these 
methods, a single collision is all that is necessary 
to completely destroy the target. Both of these 
methods cause the kinetic annihilation of the 
target.  
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satellite-killer-16108970 (Accessed 18 April 2014). 
The benefits of kinetic annihilation ASAT for the 
attacker include having the concept of operations 
well-grounded in a long tradition of military flight 
operations and, specifically, having possession, or 
full control and maintenance, of assets on the 
ground before an attack order is initiated. Most 
important of all, in contrast to signal disruption or 
terrestrial methods, if a kinetic attack succeeds as 
planned, the target is unrecoverable: the 
adversary’s space platform will not be coming 
back online.  
 
For some of the same reasons, this type of ASAT 
attack is the most critical to defend. China’s 2007 
ASAT demonstration created 2,300 traceable 
pieces of debris. This represents a significant 
percentage of the approximately 21,000 objects 
currently tracked.
11
 In almost 60 years of space 
flight, approximately one out of nine tracked 
objects is debris from the Chinese ASAT event. 
While two U.S. ASAT tests created significantly 
less debris, it only takes one kinetic annihilation 
event like the Chinese demonstration to increase 
significantly the traceable debris in orbit. This 
does not account for all the smaller pieces of 
debris that can be just as damaging because all 
objects are traveling at incredible speeds.  
 
While there have been few collisions in space, the 
odds jump with each ASAT kinetic annihilation 
event
12
. Without strong disincentives against this 
method, space will become increasingly 
dangerous. For both U.S. interests and the global 
good, ASAT demonstrations like the Chinese 
ASAT ought to be discouraged. Kinetic 
annihilation tests themselves must be deterred or 
at least performed in a way to keep orbital slots 
navigable.  
 
These methods have a characteristic, which 
should make them easier to deter: they are 
practically impossible to hide. The United States 
and other nations have the ability to detect all 
space launches as part of their nuclear deterrence 
infrastructure. For this reason, outside of a hot war 
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between superpowers, this type of attack is 
unlikely at the moment, but still, we must be 
prepared for the rise of less stable actors who 
desire to test in prelude to more aggressive moves. 
 
A future type of ASAT might be rendezvous 
disabling. Physically disabling a satellite might 
use any of the following methods, all of which 
require finely controlled rendezvous. This type 
requires the most complex satellites. The first 
method is physically damaging critical systems of 
a target satellite. It would be the most 
advantageous to use a small satellite, centimeters 
in length at most. This method could use a claw to 
snip off solar panels or antennas, which could 
either kill the electrical power system or mute the 
communication system. Even less invasive would 
be snipping the connecting wires of either of these 
systems. This method could also use a thruster to 
disable sensitive electronics. Thrusting on an 
optical sensor would at a minimum contaminate 
the lens, ruining the target’s capabilities. 
  
Another futuristic method would use directed 
electromagnetic strike, essentially using focused 
electromagnetic energy to short circuit an 
individual spacecraft. A laser could be used to 
damage electronics in the same way as the claw 
method, cutting off components or wiring. The 
aggressor satellite could puncture a target with 
two spikes and run large voltages between the 
spikes. A satellite could also attack a target by 
sending radiation or strong electromagnetic 
signals to disrupt and damage the target’s inside 
wiring and systems. These abilities are likely to be 
development intensive compared to other methods. 
This would require a less precise rendezvous, but 
a much higher power demand, leading to a larger 
satellite.  
 
The benefit of electromagnetic strike over kinetic 
annihilation is the target is disabled without 
creating a debris cloud. This lessens the 
international damage and thus the backlash of 
such an action. International actors that would use 
this method will likely try to evade detection, 
plausible with a tiny satellite or in the correct 
window of opportunity. They would hope to 
damage vital space assets free of accountability 
like actors do in the cyber realm.  
For many systems, it may be impossible to 
damage wires without disconnecting the 
component, but if an actor is able to damage 
wiring or internal systems, an attack could be 
hidden as a spacecraft malfunction. Close 
inspection of satellites, which may be the only 
way in some cases to tell the difference between 
attack and malfunction, is expensive and difficult 
due to the nature of the space environment. 
Whether a component is damaged or cut off, it is 
most important to know rapidly two things: that 
an attack actually took place and the identity of 
the attacker.  
  
The last and least likely type is an Electric 
Magnetic Pulse (EMP). The only known human 
cause of an EMP is nuclear weapons, discovered 
during high-altitude nuclear tests in the 1960’s.
13
 
Even limited powers in the space and nuclear 
arenas like North Korea might be capable of an 
EMP, but limited nuclear materials also make a 
secondary target like space unlikely. Nuclear 
weapons would be much more devastating to 
ground targets. Also, nuclear detonations in space 
are now clearly forbidden by international law and 
would surely bring the wrath of most powers 
around the world, particularly space powers that 
would be damaged in the attack.
14
 Space powers 
have even greater disincentive because they would 
be directly damaging themselves. If non-nuclear 
EMPs are possible, the best delivery would be 
similar to rendezvous attack, with a smaller area 
of effect due to power constraints and ability to 
focus against individual satellites.  
 
Each of these ASAT methods holds a different 
challenge to deterrence. Signal/intelligence 
disruption will not be covered by most deterrence 
methods because of its low permanent impact to 
space assets. Terrestrial and EMP attacks spill 
over into other national security realms, so they 
will at least be partially included in standard 
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deterrence strategies. The ASAT types most 
critical to deter, today, are kinetic annihilation and 
rendezvous disabling. Building international 
consensus against kinetic annihilation will be 
easier than rendezvous disabling due to kinetic 
attacks’ greater physical damage to the space 
environment. Yet, both are equally damaging to a 
peaceful and cooperative space environment. 
 
DETERRENCE IN SPACE 
Deterrence, in essence, is the act of 
preventing conflict escalation through 
intimidation, coercion, or fear of consequence. It 
is important to distinguish that deterrence involves 
avoiding attacks and should not be likened to 
diminishing an adversary’s capabilities.
15
 To 
establish the framework, there are three 
requirements for deterrence. First, the enemy must 
believe that their actions will be identifiable; 
otherwise, logic would preclude the absence of 
any negative consequence for the aggressor.
16
 
Next, the adversary must also be risk adverse. 
This is essentially synonymous with assuming 
rationality, a factor that is frequently mentioned 
and discussed in nuclear deterrence theory. It is 
impossible to deter an irrational actor who does 
not fear retaliation. Last and most difficult, the 
risk must outweigh the cost of aggression. The 
actor must believe that attacking will result in an 
adverse response with losses greater than the 
expected gain. 
 
The space environment is unique and should be 
given distinct consideration in analysis. Space 
assets in low earth orbit (LEO) are moving at 
about 17,500 miles per hour and are subject to 
several extreme conditions. These conditions such 
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as near vacuum pressures, free-fall, radiation, and 
extreme temperature vacillation make designing 
and placing assets in space exceedingly difficult. 
As discussed previously, the motivation for 
attacking space assets is there; the problem lies in 
preventing possible attacks. First, it is important 
to understand why conventional deterrence 
techniques might not work and what hindrances 
might be faced.  
 
In addressing the first requirement of deterrence, 
the enemy must believe that the attack can be 
traced back to them. The space environment, 
while vast, is becoming more and more populated 
as technology along with the probability of 
accidents increase. Currently, there are over 
thirteen-thousand man-made objects larger than 
ten centimeters in diameter orbiting the Earth that 
are being tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance 
System (SSS).
17
 The SSS, in conjunction with 
systems at Cavalier Air Force Station and Eglin 
Air Force Base, provides a capability of space 
awareness that is both rare yet slightly limited—
the systems are not infallible and have weaknesses.  
 
One limitation of the systems in place that the 
enemy may try to utilize is the objects being 
tracked cannot be monitored for the entirety of 
their orbits. Instead, they are usually identified 
upon detection, and, using two sets of range and 
timing data, their orbital parameters are updated a 
few times per orbit. An ASAT attack could hide in 
the blind spots of space situational awareness. 
Without adequate surveillance, a sudden loss of 
satellite functionality or communication could be 
difficult to diagnose. For example, if rendezvous 
disabling at LEO can be conducted swiftly and 
during the anonymity time window, there is little 
to no deterrence available for the attack. The only 
possibility is to narrow down suspects to those 
who possess such a capability.  
 
Assets in GEO are less numerous, but given an 
altitude of about 36,000 km, they are also harder 
to observe. With proliferation of advanced 
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technology, an attack in GEO could increase in 
likelihood with a larger window of attack, 
especially if the limits on GEO situational 
awareness endure. Also, assets in GEO tend to be 
more valuable due to the advantages of the orbit 
for communications and early warning. 
Anonymity is a complicating factor made larger 
by limited space situational awareness. There are 
possible windows of attack where the enemy can 
escape repercussions and ultimately deterrence.  
 
The second requirement of deterrence, a rational 
actor, cannot be established through previous 
crisis behaviors; however, it may prove a 
surprisingly workable assumption. Stability in 
state actors’ behavior patterns, defined by slow 
change, is a function of the difficulty inherent in 
acquiring significant space assets and technology. 
The likelihood of an undisciplined or reckless 
actor acquiring said technology is most present in 
stealing low-budget jammers and non-kinetic 
weaponry. However, with growing technology, 
more and more states are developing space 
capabilities.  
 
In the case of North Korea, it already has a space 
program with a successful launch in 2012. Many 
believe its purpose is to develop ICBMs, but with 
additional testing and design, their program could 
be repurposed for ASAT.
18
 Plus with North 
Korea’s ties to Iran and other destabilizing actors, 
the spread of technology could eventually lead to 
space assets for kinetic attack falling into the 
hands of ‘irrational actors’ with little concern for 
customary constraints of the international system. 
 
The final requirement, that the risk must be 
greater than what might be gained, is the most 
elusive. There are several unique features of the 
space environment that may make attacks more 
beneficial than was the case for nuclear deterrence 
on the ground. A fundamental difference between 
nuclear deterrence and space deterrence is the 
sheer destructive power of the assets involved. A 
nuclear attack risks both structural and more 
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importantly human capital. It affects the adversary 





With a space attack, the immediate damage is 
narrower, to an expensive and valuable asset 
leading to a loss in capability such as GPS 
coverage or military surveillance. The gain from a 
strategic space strike for a technologically inferior 
foe may be extremely valuable in a military 
conflict. Due to the difference in consequences, 
however, the international reaction is likely to be 
limited in scale when compared to a nuclear attack, 
and, especially for a revisionist state, it is much 
easier to justify an attack without human 
casualties. 
 
When considering a military response to attacks 
on a space asset, counterattack options are few. 
Scorn from the international community has not 
stopped North Korea from going nuclear, so it is 
unlikely to affect the spread of ASAT capability. 
Also, it would be hard to justify a disproportionate 
military attack on a space aggressor, to audiences 
abroad or at home, that would be severe enough to 
provide deterrence. With regard to proportional 
strikes, the attacker in a likely scenario might not 
possess significant space assets for the defender to 
retaliate against. Thus, with the increasing 
importance of our space assets, the gain for others 
in attacking them, especially without proper 
precautionary actions by the United States, can 
outweigh the cost.  
 
Another deterring factor that exists in the nuclear 
realm is the so-called first-strike taboo. A possible 
reason why a nuclear attack has not occurred since 
1945 is that no nation wants to carry the burden of 
first strike that could plausibly lead to a general 
nuclear exchange in which everyone lost.
20
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Though this factor is probably small compared to 
likely nuclear retaliation, this first-strike aversion 
does not even exist in the space realm. The only 
casualty is a space asset unknown to the nation’s 
people, and its loss may not readily affect them, 
depending on the satellite’s purpose. While long-
term effects of ASAT attacks are crippling to 
global infrastructure for communications and 
navigation due to increased debris and collisions, 
short-term effects do not provide significant 
adverse consequences. If ASAT capability exists 
and the need is present, neither fear of retaliation 
nor first-strike taboo are likely to be strong 
enough deterrents. 
 
A PLAN FOR SPACE DETERRENCE 
Given the uniqueness of the space domain 
and the hindrances to deterrence identified, 
actions that can be taken will require complex 
tradeoffs. The approach should be multifaceted, 
catering to powerful nations already in space and 
those with intentions of acquiring future space 
capabilities. To do this, our proposed plan 
incorporates a carrot-and-stick method to 
incentivize peaceful space operations as well as 
discourage ASAT attacks. 
 
First step is we must minimize the gain inherent in 
any space attack. There are numerous actionable 
methods for the U.S. to protect itself. For example, 
in order to protect crucial space assets, while it 
will be more expensive, space platform 
architecture should be distributed. A valuable and 
strategic asset to the military is encrypted and 
secure communication. The capability should not 
rely on one robust and hardy satellite but should 
be conducted by a disbursed network. With added 
redundancy, it is more difficult for an adversary to 
eliminate a U.S. capability. Terrestrial assets 
could be distributed and buried, following 
NORAD, to further reduce an attacker’s potential 
gain. These methods of distributed architecture 
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The hardiness of each satellite can also be 
increased. First of all, the U.S should continue to 
provide crucial assets with nuclear radiation 
resistance and long service lives. To combat 
ASAT methods, additional capabilities can be 
added. For example, with the expansion of 
microsatellites, they can eventually be made to 
orbit or perform proximity operations for a larger 
satellite. They can act as sensors and perform 
countermeasures to protect the larger platform. 
After a threat is detected, the micro-sat can be 
designed to respond using a variety of methods, 
including sacrificing itself or (someday) 
employing ionic fluid deflection.
22
 Lastly, the 
micro-orbiter can be used for state-of-health 
monitoring and troubleshooting. 
 
Other hardiness measures include cameras used 
for proximity visuals and threat detection, and 
mini-thrusters for additional agility. The agility is 
gained by having more robust onboard propulsion 
and control in order to navigate and avoid threats. 
This can be useful in protecting against some 
rendezvous disabling methods. Increased 
detection and movement could dissuade an 
aggressor by forcing him to meet high satellite 
control requirements. 
  
Increased space situational awareness is also 
critical for strengthened deterrence. Upgrading 
U.S. space surveillance capabilities to close the 
holes in awareness at LEO and GEO would help 
hold aggressors accountable and allow for greater 
countermeasures. Research into this and other 
protective technologies should be bolstered to 
develop essential capabilities that increase 
deterrence. 
 
Reducing the gains from attack is an ongoing 
effort as well as one that should be researched for 
                                                                                          
(2013): 91; 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-
satellite_Weapons.pdf (accessed April 26, 2014). 
22
 Thomas Joslyn, information received by author, 
Rocket Propulsion Class Lecture, USAFA, May 3, 
2013. Ionic fluid deflection is an experimental concept 
that would use vector ionic liquids as a momentum 
transfer medium to perturb incoming objects away 
from the primary satellite.  
 Shea, Johnson, Zurita / Deterring ASAT 66 
 
more effective technologies. However, a smaller 
gain may not be a complete disincentive. 
Therefore, a retaliatory stick is necessary for the 
carrot-and-stick approach to work. Denial of 
access to the domain itself in response to 
successful or even attempted aggression might 
instill fear in would-be attackers.  
 
The major space powers, the United States, Russia, 
and now China, have the technical wherewithal to 
execute kinetic ASAT exercises as a 
demonstration of power and of their willingness to 
deter space attacks by punishment. However, it 
has not been expressly stated how these ASAT 
capabilities will be utilized. If an agreement were 
made to use this capability for denying access to 
the space domain for any state or entity that acts 
aggressively, it might provide benefits that would 
have to be weighed against the costs and 
difficulties of maintaining agreement among 
enforcer powers as to who, in space, were the 
aggressors. 
 
Everett Dolman points out in Astropolitik that an 
international space agency could be erected to 
oversee all actions and efforts conducted in the 
space domain.
23
 This is politically unfeasible; 
even the United States would not allow others to 
search its satellites, but an international agency 
could serve to minimize excesses of unilateralism. 
This organization would determine when a 
country has crossed the line into ‘aggression’ and 
coordinate denial of space against the culprit. It 
would prevent the aggressor from gaining space 
technologies and from launching successfully, 
perhaps via the interception of its rockets. 
 
Credible prosecution of this deterrence-by-
punishment system would rely upon capabilities 
of countries like the United States, China, and 
Russia. The international organization could also 
oversee rehabilitation and eventual recertification 
of previous aggressors as well as probationary 
inspections of launches once the aggressor is 
permitted to reenter the space domain. 
Reinstatement would need to be a stringent and 
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lengthy process to make deterrence work against 
ASAT.  
 
To earn its keep, the anti-ASAT organization 
could also resolve space disputes and help 
regulate information and materials that could be 
used for ASAT capabilities. It should also set 
regulations for the disposal of satellites that are 
too dangerous to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere 
on their own. The United States already set a 
precedent, albeit controversial, for this in 2008. 
Regulations would, as an alternative to far more 
cumbersome multilateral negotiations, outline 
what is considered dangerous and who is capable 
of properly disposing satellites while minimizing 
debris.  
 
There is at least one major complication in 
punishment through space denial: Most countries 
will not stand for an attack against a manned 
launch, and the United States would not want to 
pull the trigger in this case either. There is still 
some benefit to preventing just unmanned 
launches. Manned launches cost more because of 
life support equipment and supplies, and most 
countries’ space programs are not designed to 
function through purely manned launches. At a 
minimum, the aggressor country at least suffers 
additional economic cost for continuing a space 
program—even if manned launches are excluded 
from punishment. 
 
Another objection to the “stick” of punishment by 
attacking unauthorized launches is that it is too 
risky for those that enforce denial of space access. 
Yet, as was the case for classical deterrence, harsh 
consequences are the only way to convey that the 
space domain is really protected and that assets 
should not be marginalized. One of the key 
principles of nuclear deterrence is still the risk of 
nation-ending destruction. While space does not 
have such an extreme without nuclear weapons in 
play, having a risk of escalation and punishment is 
needed to deter an aggressor in the first place. The 
aggressor must see the possibility of severe 
punishment as part of what makes the cost of 
ASAT too high to be worth the potential benefit. 
 
For the carrot in this proposed plan, it is also 
important to incentivize peaceful space operations. 
There are many methods to approach this, some 
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already in place. First, international partnerships 
with not only nations maintaining large programs 
but those with smaller initiatives that might be 
pooled should be established or bolstered. The 
International Space Station is a prime example of 
the successes achievable through international 
efforts. The ISS acts as a stabilizing agent through 
the concept of self-defeat.
24
 For example, if a 
country that participates on the ISS wanted to also 
conduct an ASAT attack on an asset in LEO, they 
might be dissuaded by the prospect of 
endangering their own assets whether human or 
technical. Also, such an attack would immediately 
jeopardize all programs conducted in the 
international effort due to repercussions that 
would follow.  
 
Difficulties with “space aid” that may be 
anticipated include supplier restrictions on the 
distribution of proprietary information, as well as 
incompatible commercial or security interests 
among competing sovereigns, and endemic fiscal 
limitations. For this kinder, gentler approach to 
work with the United States as a spearhead, a 
reinvigorated interest at home in the space effort 
must be seen followed by an increased budget for 
space.  
 
Another method of incentivizing budding space 
ventures as well as peaceful operations abroad 
could be offering other countries access to space 
assets in return for support in joint operations and 
work to improve their own space programs. 
Assets such as satellite communications, GPS, and 
satellite entertainment are very desirable to 
nations that do not currently possess said 
technology. This carrot has the potential to realize 
a global community committed to peaceful 
operations as well as effective, and profitable, 
space ventures through synergistic and 
cooperative efforts. 
 
Ultimately, international commitment is critical to 
successful space deterrence. Deterring ASAT 
should not be a solely U.S. endeavor if its purpose 
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is to sustain a peaceful environment for all nations. 
There is incentive for many nations to join a 
regime that includes both the carrot and the stick. 
Implementation of this plan requires an enormous 
international effort and will not be settled upon 
immediately.  
 
At the same time, the harshness of the stick in this 
plan should not be alleviated in order to reach a 
watered-down, multilateral consensus. A true 
consequence needs to be established that will 
effectively deter ASAT attacks as the space 
domain becomes more and more accessible and 
the possibility of attack increases.  
Also, peaceful access to the space domain should 
be promoted and proliferated. The proliferation of 
space assets can be stabilizing, a parallel to 
Waltz’s concept of nuclear deterrence when every 
state accepts that something it values dearly is 
being held hostage, as collateral for good 
behavior.
25
 Cooperative efforts, access to valuable 
space services, and induction into an elite group 
can be extremely exciting and motivating for a 
developing country.  
 
Assuming success with an overwhelming majority 
involved in this international and eventually 
global space posture, the environment could be 
extremely intimidating, indeed forbidding, to a 
prospective aggressor. The hope is that in the long 
run, carrot-and-stick arrangements transition from 
a deterrence method to a governance system for 
establishing and maintaining stable and reliable 
access to space for the global community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Space is, and will continue to be, a critical 
environment for both civilian and military 
operations. Due to its value to the United States 
and other nations, there are strong incentives for 
technologically inferior challengers to disrupt and 
destroy space assets. As more countries gain space 
capabilities, the environment will continue to 
become more crowded and more complex. It also 
has the potential to become more dangerous, for 
there are numerous ASAT methods that need to be 
deterred. 
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An effective way forward consists of three parts: 
reducing the gain of ASAT; brandishing a stick 
for aggressors; and offering a carrot for peaceful 
sharing of the space environment. The most 
effective way to minimize the gain of ASAT 
attacks is distributing the space architecture. 
Using disbursed fleets of many satellites 
significantly lessens the impact of one ASAT 
attack. The stick punishing aggressors is 
subsequent denial of their using the space 
environment. Denial might be coordinated and 
executed by an internationally established space 
agency, which would take responsibility for 
shooting down aggressors’ space launches, 
restricting technology from rogue actors in space, 
and sanctioning individuals involved in violating 
space law and regulations. Equally important is 
the carrot: building relationships between national 
space agencies and working on joint projects. 
Major projects like the International Space Station 
deepen ties between countries even when 
earthbound issues create tensions.  
 
Deliberation and agreement among countries, 
particularly space powers, is vital to both the 
carrot and the stick of deterring ASAT attacks. 
The process should be led by the United States but 
will be useless without international buy-in. 
Compromise is necessary, but toothless 
agreements to attain a putative consensus will be 
ineffective. The world needs a peaceful and 
cooperative space environment, and the sooner an 
effective method of deterring ASAT is established, 
the closer we will be to a better future for both the 
United States and the whole of mankind. 
 
 Essays  
Book Review 
The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security by 
Bartholomew Sparrow (Public Affairs, 2015)  
 
Schuyler Foerster 
A popular new biography pays overdue tribute to a living legend. 
 
Bartholomew Sparrow’s rich and detailed 
biography of Brent Scowcroft—a still very active 
and now nonagenarian—has been on bookshelves 
since early this year.
1
  Many, including those who 
have an intimate familiarity with some of the 
events and personalities in this book, have already 
offered thorough reviews of the work.
2
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 Dr. Schuyler Foerster is the Brent Scowcroft 
Professor of National Security Studies in the 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, 
Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force 
Academy.  The views expressed here are his own. 
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 As examples of some of the more substantive reviews 
of Sparrow’s biography, see Hal Brands, “Bookshelf: 
Grand Strategy in the Real World,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 23 January 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/book-
review-the-strategist-by-bartholomew-sparrow-
1422053450; Steve Donoghue, “Book Review: ‘The 
Strategist,’” Open Letters Monthly: An Arts and 
Literature Review, 
www.openlettersmonthly.com/book-review-the-
strategist/; Roger Harrison, “Book Review: ‘The 
Strategist’ by Bartholomew Sparrow,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, 
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Reviews, “The Strategist,” 
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“Sunday Book Review: ‘The Strategist: Brent 
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www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/books/review/the-
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security.html; James Mann, “Book Review: ‘The 
Strategist,’ on Brent Scowcroft, by Bartholomew 
Sparrow,” The Washington Post, 30 January 2015, 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-the-
The purpose of this review, therefore, will not be 
to shed new light on the biography but to focus on 
what this reviewer believes is the more enduring 
message of the narrative, and, indeed, the life of 
Brent Scowcroft. 
Brent Scowcroft’s life has been—and remains—
one of commitment, hard work, and service to the 
nation above personality, political party, or 
personal preference.  His legacy—as Sparrow 
details and with which others agree—is one of 
even-handedness and integrity.  He has largely 
succeeded in managing the most difficult policy 
issues as well as some of the most difficult 
personalities in the policy world.  Scowcroft is not, 
as Sparrow and other reviewers have noted, 
without error or misjudgment, but he nonetheless 
sets a standard for dedication to higher purposes, 
which Sparrow’s biography celebrates.  
Sparrow details Scowcroft’s roots in a modest 
Mormon family, as well as Brent’s own 
extraordinary work ethic as a young boy.  His 
formative years were shaped by the run-up to 
World War II, and his instincts took him to West 
Point, from which he graduated in 1947.  Too late 
to fight in World War II, he survived an almost 
fatal crash-landing in 1949 that ended his 
operational flying career and precluded a combat 
role for an individual ironically destined to play 
such an influential role in shaping national 
security policy. 
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963-2. 
 Foerster / The Strategist 70 
 
The policy role that Scowcroft ended up playing 
began in academe under a formidable set of 
mentors—William T. R. Fox at Columbia and, in 
the famed “SOSH” (or “Social Sciences”) 
Department at West Point, Col Herman Beukema 
and Col George “Abe” Lincoln.  This was not the 
academe of theoretical debates, but of application 
of theory to a profession whose raison d’être was 
national security.  The coin of the realm was 
“realism”—for Scowcroft, not realism devoid of 
moral content, but one that defines the boundaries 
in which moral purposes can be prudently pursued.   
On the one hand, that instinct for realism 
produced a determination that the national 
security establishment be structured to identify 
complex relationships of power and the strengths 
and vulnerabilities not only of others but also of 
ourselves.  Such a structure should not serve 
narrow individual, political, or bureaucratic 
purposes; rather, it should serve the President in 
the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities.  
Sparrow describes in immense detail Scowcroft’s 
years of holding important staff jobs in the 
military, but which, for Scowcroft, was a world 
dominated by drudgery and bureaucracy.   
In subsequent years—in restructuring the National 
Security Council (NSC) in the Ford 
Administration after Henry Kissinger left to be 
Secretary of State, and in rebuilding that structure 
as George H. W. Bush’s National Security 
Advisor after the Iran-Contra debacle—one sees 
Scowcroft’s concern for “process,” not for its own 
sake but to ensure that the best analyses and 
competing recommendations find their way to the 
table, and are not shut out because of ego, stove-
piped structures, or muzzled staffers.  Issues need 
to be seen as they are, not as one wishes them to 
be; the best policies are often a mix of seemingly 
contradictory proposals (as in the Scowcroft 
Commission’s delicate balancing of arms control 
and strategic force modernization to fit political 
realities of the early Reagan Administration).  The 
policy apparatus—not just the ‘guru’ at the 
center—must be equipped to visualize both the 
realities and the opportunities. 
That instinct for realism, of course, can also cloud 
one’s vision.  This reviewer recalls an interview 
on the Today show in spring 1989, when a major 
review of national security policy that Scowcroft 
had launched was coming to an end.  When asked 
if the review was producing any new insights, 
Scowcroft replied, “We’re not quite done, but it 
looks like the future will look a lot like the past, 
on a more or less straight line of projection.”  
Sparrow highlights this period, and other 
reviewers note that Scowcroft’s conservative 
instincts reinforced skepticism that Gorbachev 
was genuinely interested in effecting a major 
change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  Then, 
when it became clear Gorbachev was so inclined, 
Scowcroft remained less enthusiastic about the 
opportunities and increasingly concerned about 
whether such changes could be managed. 
Managing a “world transformed” (in the words of 
the memoir that Scowcroft co-authored with 
George H. W. Bush)—the end of the Cold War, 
the unification of Germany in NATO, and the 
demise of the Soviet Union—represented the 
consummate accomplishment of that 
Administration, one that subsequent generations 
can easily underestimate.  The Bush national 
security team may not have envisioned the 
possibilities these changes might bring.  Indeed, in 
later years, Scowcroft was openly skeptical about 
some of them, including the enlargement of 
NATO (a view he shared with George Kennan, 
who had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia when 
Scowcroft was Air Attaché).  But that team was 
enormously effective in anticipating how these 
changes could be inherently destabilizing to the 
international order and in focusing on how to 
preserve as much stability as possible. 
Scowcroft is the first to say that he is not a 
visionary.  In 2011, at an Aspen Institute event in 
his honor, Scowcroft was asked about the secret 
of his success.  Without hesitation, he replied, “I 
have always tried to surround myself with people 
smarter than I.”  If “smarter” means expertise, 
then Scowcroft did indeed focus on bringing 
people into his net—whether at the NSC or in his 
post-government consulting business—who were 
“smarter” than he.  If “smarter” includes instincts 
about how ego and presumption can get in the 
way of a better outcome for a higher purpose, then 
there are few who are “smarter” than Brent 
Scowcroft. 
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Although Scowcroft’s career quickly shifted from 
the military academic world of West Point and the 
Air Force Academy (where he served from 1962 
to 1964, including as Acting Department Head in 
1963-64) to the cauldron of policy making, a 
substantial part of his legacy will remain in the 
world of education.  Sparrow details how 
Scowcroft’s consulting business produced 
significant wealth, and Scowcroft has contributed 
substantially to a host of institutions, not all of 
which bear his name.  At a dinner in his honor to 
inaugurate the Scowcroft Professorship in 
National Security Studies at the Air Force 
Academy, this reviewer asked him how he would 
charge the incumbent in that position.  Without 
reservation, and in his typically understated way, 
he said, “Teach them how to think, not what to 
think.”  In Sparrow’s biography, Scowcroft recalls 
a mentor many years prior who did just that for 
him.  It is a value that transcends expertise and 
instills both perspective and an antenna for 
complexity. 
Brent Scowcroft is a “heroic” figure in large part 
because he has endured and survived.  On a 
personal level, Sparrow’s biography tells the 
little-known story of how Brent provided home 
care for his wife, Jackie, during her 25-year long 
and burdensome illness, even while his time in 
government demanded all of his energy.  No 
complaints; indeed, few even knew.  
Professionally, over the last half century, 
Scowcroft has worked with—and been buffeted 
by—some of the largest figures in national 
security policy.  He has been at the center of 
countless key foreign policy decisions, for which 
he was the man in the background rather than the 
man out front.  He challenged orthodoxy, but 
rarely people.  He garnered respect from all sides 
of the aisle.  He worked, it seems, harder and 
longer than anyone else.  That reputation also 
enabled him to “speak truth to power,” as when he 
warned publicly in August 2002 about the dangers 
of a precipitous invasion of Iraq—a position for 
which he was spurned by many but ultimately 
vindicated by history. 
Sparrow quotes Scowcroft as saying there is 
“nothing better than to be working for something 
greater than you are.”  Many commentators have 
suggested that Scowcroft will not be remembered 
for the policies he shaped or the structures he 
reformed.  In that respect, as one reviewer noted, 
he is a “transitional” figure.  This reviewer 
suggests that this misses the broader point.  We 
hope he will be remembered for the moral 
compass that underscored an unrelenting 
commitment to service, a determination to base 
policy on national interest grounded in the best 
analysis that can be brought to bear, and—most of 
all—an unwavering sense of his own humanity, 
and the modesty and compassion that comes with 
it.  While we await Brent Scowcroft’s own 
memoirs, we can thank Bartholomew Sparrow for 





 Essays  
Publishers Corner 
Manned Space Exploration: America’s Folly  
 
Roger G. Harrison 
Advocates of manned space exploration have some explaining to do. 
 
If we want to assess the benefits of human 
space exploration, particularly to Mars, who better 
to consult than the good folks at MIT, a place 
presumably bristling with engineering knowledge 
and  human genius.  Fortuitously enough, the 
“Space, Policy and Society Research Group” at 
MIT has produced a study on “The Future of 
Human Space Flight” for our edification and 
enjoyment.  It is six years old at this writing, but 
the facts have not altered appreciably: the humans 
who would have to be transported to, sustained on, 
and returned from the red planet are the same frail 
and physically limited homo sapiens they have 
always been; they are still carbon-based life forms, 
and therefore dependent on oxygen and water; and 
they are still  as  certain to deteriorate and die 
after relatively short periods of exposure to 
gamma and other radiation at strengths present in 
space and (especially) on the surface of Mars.   
What are the justifications for flinging such 
creatures into the vastness of space?  The MIT 
report purports to provide some.  Though the 
product of scientists, the study is not, in a strict 
sense, scientific.  It is, rather, a piece of advocacy 
whose authors are intent on demonstrating that 
human space exploration is worth the admittedly 
high cost in lives and treasure.  Still, there are 
obvious things that even these advocates feel 
constrained to accept.  Hence their conclusion that, 
whatever the case for human space exploration 
might be, it does not include the advancement of 
scientific knowledge on the one hand, or the 
prospect of turning an honest dollar on the other. 
This is the burden of the Study’s identification of 
supposed “primary” and “secondary” objectives 
of human space travel.  Interestingly, the authors 
identify as “secondary” all the possible tangible 
benefits, and as “primary” the intangible ones.  By 
this reckoning, “science, economic development, 
new technologies and education” – in short,  those 
things most widely touted as the “pay off” from 
vast investments necessary for human space travel 
– are “secondary” objectives, which the authors 
conclude do not justify the cost and risk to human 
life.  By this account, you space miners, you 
builders of self-sustaining H3-extracting 
settlements on the moon, you Hiltons of space 
with your orbiting hostels, even you tourist 
promoters eyeing brief near-space junkets for the 
rich – all of you are promoting projects that are 
economically unprofitable, scientifically 
unjustified, and morally dubious.          
No less a pundit than Neil deGrasse Tyson seems 
to have reached a similar conclusion.  He argues 
that governments rather than private industry will 
have to sponsor the first human trips to Mars. 
Industry won’t do it, Tyson says, because it will 
be hugely expensive, with high probability of 
fatalities and no economic return.  If he means 
that only governments are misguided, lobby-
ridden, and morally obtuse enough to engage in 
such activity, I agree.  But even governments 
cannot escape the problem of moral hazard 
without some overwhelming purpose to justify the 
sacrifice of human lives that even the most 
optimistic admit will be required.    
On this point, the MIT study purports to come to 
the rescue.  If tangible benefits do not meet the 
moral hazard or even the economic test of human 
space flight, what does?  Intangible benefits, of 
course – those which the Study disingenuously 
identifies as the “primary” goals of space travel.  
Why primary?  Because the authors say so!  The 
great benefit of intangible goals to any piece of 
advocacy – especially one written by scientists – 
is that they are not quantifiable.  In the great 
scales of ethics and economics, they can have any 
value you choose to give them.  Things you can 
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measure are recalcitrant; they don’t yield to the 
political narrative.  Intangible returns, on the other 
hand, can explain, balance, and justify anything.  
Chief among the intangible “primary goals” of 
human space exploration, the MIT study identifies   
“international prestige,” and who can say they‘re 
wrong?  Once intangibles enter the door, science 
flees out the window, and suddenly we are in a 
fantasy land of national narrative, quest sagas, and 
public relations – and never mind that Buzz 
Aldrin has taken to doing underwear commercials. 
I’m not a scientist, but I am willing to trust the 
MIT investigators.  I accept the idea there is no 
economic or scientific benefit in human space 
flight that will offset the cost in lives and treasure 
it involves.  I would go further.  Boosters have 
been overpromising the benefits of human space 
flight for fifty years, and it is past time to call their 
bluff.  Where are the promised scientific 
achievements from human habitation of the space 
station?  I can answer that question: always 
sometime just after the next budget cycle.  What 
might have been done with the 120 billion dollars 
in construction costs for the space station, or with 
the 500 billion – at least – that another manned 
venture to the moon and Mars would cost?  It 
would go a long way toward easing the budget 
squeeze on those charged with improving our 
nation’s missile and space defenses, not to 
mention repair our rotting terrestrial infrastructure.  
I have to admit: as I contemplate NASA’s heavy 
launcher to nowhere, and its silly plan to tether 
men to asteroids, I can’t help thinking what 
building a more humane, more enlightened, 
better-paved, and better defended nation would do 
for our international prestige! 
In short, human space exploration is a jobs 
program for the few, and an impediment to both 
national defense and the expansion of human 
knowledge.  It might be thought of as the modern 
equivalent of flagpole sitting: once we put aside 
xenophobia and national exceptionalism, the only 
point seems to be to find out how long someone 
can stand it.*  Even the nationalists and 
xenophobes are destined in the end to be 
disappointed.  However specious the reasoning, 
our species will eventually send a few sacrificial 
humans to Mars.  The first of them will step on 
terra nova long after I join the choir celestial; but 
it doesn’t take a seer to predict that the flag she 
plants will not be that of any one nation but rather 
a pastel creation (think UN blue) representing a 
consortium of nations and industries and probably 
designed by Elon Musk, one of whose companies 
will have purchased all the film rights and logo 
space on the lander.  
*For the record, the disputed record for flagpole 
sitting is 68 days, claimed by one John 
“Shipwreck” Kelly.  The verified record for time 
in space is 438 days by the Russian Valeri 
Polyakov.  Polyakov’s record involved some 
trillions of dollars of infrastructure investment; 
Kelly required only a pole, a rope, two buckets, 
and an assistant whose name is lost to history. 
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